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Introduction 
In recent years, theories of political institutions have become central to the literature on 
Latin American politics. As has been discussed elsewhere, the study of institutions has ranged 
from detailed histories of institutional evolution to more discrete analyses of strategic action 
under the constraints of a given set of rules. Other have identified this work generally as 
representing an "institutionalist tradition" (Huber and Dion 2002) or as the study of behavior in 
"institutional contexts" (Crisp and Escobar-Lemmon 2001), and often it is subsumed within 
broader discussions of “rational choice institutionalism” (e.g., Weyland 2002). Munck (2004) 
recently distinguishes work with an institutional focus from other strands of the literature on 
Latin American politics, noting that there is much each perspective can learn from the others. In 
this chapter, we highlight an emerging synthesis that derives insights from various forms of 
institutional analysis.  First, we present a conceptual framework for analyzing constitutional 
structures and party systems--an approach that we brand neo-Madisonian. Using several 
examples from the region, we emphasize the relationship between constitutional design, electoral 
systems and party systems as they relate to this framework. Second, we use this framework to 
synthesize segments of the literature on Latin American institutions, tying together a variety of 
works that consider both national context and broad patterns across the region while accounting 
for the dynamic relationship between institutions and actors. Work in this vein, we argue, is 
united by its integration of the study of formal constitutional and electoral structure with an 
understanding of the incentives facing the actors charged with working within that structure. In 
Latin American research, such work has especially contributed to our understanding of the 
separation of powers, the logic of delegation in democratic representation, the capacity for 
collective action among political actors, and the interaction between these phenomena. In a final 
section, we review several important next steps for this literature. 
 
Studying Political Institutions: a Neo-Madisonian Approach  
 Neo-Madisonian theory starts from the basic theoretical underpinning of the Federalists 
that the extent to which government ensures liberty or gives way to tyranny is directly related to 
the manner in which it channels political ambition. Like contemporary rational-choice 
approaches, James Madison took it as axiomatic that political actors are motivated by personal 
gain and, hence, the good motives of leaders can never be taken for granted. He accepted selfish 
motivation as inevitable and therefore sought to harness it for the greater good.  Doing so, he 
argued, entailed establishing a system of institutions that structure and checks that ambition. 
 Modern neo-Madisonian theory begins from a more explicit theoretical construct 
regarding the delegation of authority as solutions to the collective action problems that are 
inherent in the pursuit of group interests. Madison understood that representative democracy 
necessarily entails delegation, using that very term in defining republic as “the delegation of the 
government… to a small number of citizens elected by the rest” (Federalist 10).  Further, 
Madison emphasized that any power delegated to representatives has the potential to be turned 
against the principal. Therefore, Madison argued, multiple competing agents of the citizenry 
must each be empowered and motivated to check the ambition of the others.  
What is distinctive about the neo-Madisonian body of literature is that it explicitly draws 
on contemporary political-economy traditions developed outside the study of government. For 
instance, Mancur Olson’s modern classic, The Logic of Collective Action (1965), is concerned 
primarily with the formation of economic lobbying groups, not governmental institutions, yet his 
well-known theory provides a starting point for expanding Madison's basic logic.
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 Principal–
agent theory developed in economics, in part, to explain why and how firms emerge and 
organize hierarchically, rather than anarchically like markets. Ronald Coase's (1937) pioneering 
work
2
 posits that firms, or hierarchies, emerge in response to the inefficiencies associated with 
market transactions, replacing the market’s “invisible hand” with the very visible hand of a 
manager. Elaborating these themes, Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) influential theory of the firm 
argues that the collective dilemma of individual shirking within groups can be overcome via 
delegation to a central agent, analogous to a political entrepreneur, with the authority and 
incentive to reward and punish group members.
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 What these works have in common is that the 
difficulties of spontaneous group interaction and the tension between an individual interest and 
collective interests may both be resolved by delegating authority to monitor— and mete out 
rewards and punishments—to an agent with the incentive to accomplish this task. The 
development of a set of rules for empowering agents and structuring their incentives to work on 
behalf of the principal is the very essence of institutional design. 
 It is the marriage of theories distinguishing hierarchy from anarchy with the older 
tradition of designing “good government” that marks the contribution of the neo-Madisonian 
perspective to political science. While contemporary research in this tradition is not generally 
normative, it is grounded in a broader enterprise seeking to elucidate why and how democracy 
“works” and the sources of its failures and limitations. Rather than prescribing ‘optimal’ 
arrangements, a neo-Madisonian approach emphasizes that democratic institutions create 
incentives that interact to generate a series of democratic trade-offs regarding outcomes ranging 
from the stability or rigidity of policy to the extent of public goods provision. 
 
Hierarchies and Transactions 
 Neo-Madisonian theory is interested in the organization of government in terms of the 
hierarchical and transactional juxtaposition of institutions.  In a hierarchy one institution is 
subordinated to another. Hierarchy is thus about vertical relationships, in that one actor is 
superior to another in terms of authority. Transactional relationships, on the other hand, are 
among co-equals. Two institutions or actors in a transactional relationship each have independent 
sources of authority, and must cooperate to accomplish some task. Madison’s call for ambition to 
check ambition is, in essence, a means to prevent the emergence of a hierarchical relationship 
between executives and legislatures that he believed led to oppression, and instead ensure that 
the executive and legislature were coequals.
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In this tradition, a neo-Madisonian approach traces political ambition and organizational 
relationships, looking at the relative balance between hierarchical and transactional relationships 
within the governmental structure. Doing so means understanding how the component 
institutions of a political system work together: With whom must political actors transact?  To 
whom are they subordinate?  Patterns of democratic failure might emerge, for example, when a 
formally horizontal relationship between the executive and legislature—constitutionally 
prescribed as separate and co-equal—has become de facto hierarchical. Rather than discarding 
an institutional explanation as inadequate because the expectations of formal institutions clearly 
seem to be violated, the approach we highlight seeks to explain why it is rational for legislators to 
act contrary to their own organizational autonomy and sometimes subordinate themselves to 
some other entity. The answer, from a neo-Madisonian perspective, lies in how legislators are 
given incentives to behave in certain patterned ways, both with respect to one another (e.g., 
favoring a powerful central leadership within the legislature) and with respect to outside 
institutions (e.g., acceding to the dominance of the executive). Armed with these insights, then, 
we can better understand the more systematic limitations of democracy in a given case, and gain 
insight into the political reforms or electoral changes that would be necessary to bring about a 
more transactional relationship.  
Key ideas from the Federalists 
 One of the fundamental insights of Madison, from Federalist 51, is his point that the 
design of government “consists in giving to those who administer each department [i.e. branch] 
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others” 
(emphasis ours). Here, as well as in his famous phrase alluded to above that “ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition,” Madison recognized that political actors were self-interested and 
that the key to successful institutional design lay in the creation of a set of incentives that would 
align their individual interests with the collective goal of generating good government by 
preventing one branch from dominating others.  In other words, political actors at every stage 
consistently find themselves facing the tension between personal interest and a collective good, 
and pursue a course of action consistent with the incentives they face.  
 A further set of insights from Madison that informs neo-Madisonian work on political 
institutions comes from Federalist 10, where Madison grapples with the inherent conflict of 
interest that arises when legislators are advocates and parties to the very causes that they 
determine, through the legislation they produce. The solution, as Madison famously argued, was 
to prevent the emergence of “majority faction” by dividing political authority not only into 
different branches, but also different levels (national, state, and local).  Power in the Madisonian 
model is therefore divided and shared between the dual agents of the electorate in the national 
government -- the president and the assembly -- such that power delegated to one agent can be 
vetoed or blocked by another, thereby preventing agents from unilaterally pursuing actions 
against the principal's interest.  Power is further divided between national and subnational 
interests, for instance by having Representatives be delegates of their local communities and 
Senators of their states,
5
 and by maintaining the separate authority of state governments over 
their own affairs. 
 If the objective of the U.S. constitution was to prevent one part of the government from 
dominating the others the framers were largely successful. The US remains the paradigmatic case 
of separation of powers, with the executive and the legislative branches closely balanced, and 
with one of the world’s most active judiciaries. Because of the separate election of two national 
legislative bodies and the national executive, “divided government” in which one or both houses 
of the legislature is controlled by a different political party than the executive is common.
6
 More 
importantly, the incentives derived from separate constituencies and fixed terms means that even 
when the executive and legislative majorities are of the same party, differences in policy 
priorities often result, and must be resolved by interbranch transactions.  
 If Madison and his colleagues were largely successful in preventing the subordination of 
the executive to the legislature and vice versa, it is nonetheless clear that tendencies toward 
“majority faction” emerged within the legislature.  In an exemplary use of theories of collective 
action and delegation, Cox and McCubbins (1993) explain how the U.S. House of 
Representatives has become organized in the interests of its majority as legislators solve a basic 
collective dilemma created by the individual incentives of the electoral system and their common 
electoral label. The label—its programmatic brand name and the reputation associated with it—is 
a classic public good in that there exists no inherent motivation to spontaneously work to 
maintain its value.
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  The collective goal is facilitated and enforced by delegation to a central 
authority—in this case, party leadership—empowered to steer legislative outcomes in favor of 
the interests of that legislative majority.   
The U.S. example is instructive in demonstrating the interplay between collective and 
individual electoral incentives within the legislature. Madison argued that majority faction could 
be controlled by preventing common interest among a majority or, failing that, by undermining 
the majority's capacity for collective action upon those interests.  Though neither goal may seem 
successful in Cox and McCubbins’ account of the U.S. House, even this “Leviathan” does not 
dominate the entire policy-making process as a result of the system of institutional checks. In 
terms of interbranch relations, institutions that empower the legislative majority actually enhance 
checks and balances. Establishing a capacity for collective action within a legislative chamber is 
an important condition for that chamber to act as an independent agent that transacts with, rather 
than subordinates itself to, the executive.   
Moreover, the very existence of this collective dilemma—the divergence of individual 
interests that must be aligned—ensures that the House does not stray from Madison’s goal of 
articulating multiple local interests. As a voluminous literature on the US House shows, 
members remain well attached to their districts and pursue a “personal vote” based on their own 
service as agents of their community.  Even with a form of “majority faction” controlling the 
agenda of the House of Representatives, the US legislative process remains far less party-
centered than those of many nations, especially West European parliamentary democracies, but 
also some Latin American countries.  As we argue below, a fundamental aspect of political 
systems in Latin America and elsewhere is in the degree to which legislators are motivated by 
national party goals, on the one hand, versus personal and local interests on the other.  
 Combining Madisonian insights with Olsonian logic, we can see the broad outlines of a 
contemporary neo-Madisonian approach to political institutions. The underlying task is to trace 
the sources of political ambition, and to uncover the ways in which the institutional structure 
provides—or fails to provide—incentives for the politicians who inhabit it to resist 
encroachments by other institutions. Just as importantly, the task centers on understanding the 
extent to which the majority has the incentives and capacity to organize to block minorities from 
gaining a share of political authority both within and across the institutions of government.  
Most theoretical and empirical advances to date focus on the legislature, asking what 
incentives politicians have to rationally pursue policy, personal, or other goals. The simplifying 
assumption in the literature on the US is almost invariably the reelection motivation. Although 
many studies of Latin America start from the same premise, much of the advance in 
understanding the divergence from the well-studied US case has come in forcing a notion of 
ambition that is both more precise and more generalizable
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: Politicians seek to continue a 
political career more broadly, not necessarily to be reelected to their current post.
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In either form—legislative reelection or future-office career advancement—it is 
understanding this powerful assumption that allows for the analysis of how personal goals impel 
members towards either collective institutional development or other outcomes. The neo-
Madisonian approach has focused much of its energy on seeking to understand just what it is 
about variations in the sources of legislative incentives that explains patterns of inter-institutional 
relations in different Latin American countries. The source of that variation has been linked to 
questions of how legislators obtain office (electoral systems, party systems, nomination 
practices) and what posts they seek afterwards and what actors control access to those (whether 
voters, the president, governors, or interest groups). 
Neo-Madisonian theory: an Overview 
Neo-Madisonian theory aims to explain the logic of constitutional design with respect to 
the powers granted to agents and the incentives for using those powers.  A given design of the 
formal separation of powers might render a president purely reactive in terms of legislative 
authority, unable to independently change the status quo.  Conversely, the balance of positive 
legislative power might be skewed in the executive’s favor, relegating the assembly to this 
reactive role. In either case, each agent is, to a varying extent, constrained by the powers 
delegated to the other within their transactional relationship. However, as we have already noted, 
the maintenance of a transactional relationship depends on constitutional agents with 
countervailing interests.  When the incentives of each agent are not counterposed, they may 
collude, weakening or disabling the checks that shape their transactional relationship and 
potentially rendering the relationship effectively hierarchical.  Further, a transactional 
relationship depends upon the degree of overlapping focus in terms of the “currency” of the 
transaction. That is, in order for multiple competing agents to form a meaningful structure that 
protects the interests of the principal, agents must to some extent compete in the same arena. 
 The neo-Madisonian approach emphasizes that the political ambition of democratic 
agents
10
 follows from rules comprising the structure of delegation.  In constitutional design 
terms, ‘ambition’ is shaped by a number of interacting component institutions within regimes 
that structure the chain of democratic accountability.  They generate the electoral and career 
incentives faced by democratic representatives—that is, how and to whom they are ultimately 
held accountable. These incentives, in turn, shape the transactional relationship among 
constitutional agents.  Furthermore, these incentives at each stage of the delegation chain 
structure not only legislative agents’ goals, but also their own capacity for collective action both 
as agents and as collective principals in secondary delegation relationships between legislators 
and their leadership or with the executive branch, including not only the president, but also the 
bureaucracy. 
Incentives facing presidents and assemblies can create divergent ambition in two 
orthogonally related ways: their political goals and in their policy orientation.  An agent’s 
political goals pertain to its political connectedness to other actors—for example, the extent to 
which a single party or coalition controls both the presidency and the legislative branch. An 
agent's policy orientation, however, pertains to the local or national focus of each agent—
generally, each agent’s interests in the provision of public goods or goods that are more targeted 
or private in nature.  Each of these dimensions of agent incentives is influenced by the 
component institutions shaping the representation structure within a separation of powers system.  
Each dimension, in Madison's terms, shapes the extent of "majority faction" within the 
legislature or across branches in terms of political concentration and national focus.   
Institutions can increase or decrease the likelihood that agents have similar political 
goals. Whether presidents typically command a legislative majority, as well as the ‘size’ of 
legislative parties more generally, varies greatly across cases and is related to the design of 
electoral institutions. We refer to the incentives influencing these circumstances as the interparty 
dimension of electoral institutions. For instance, electoral rules that entail a very low threshold 
for the representation of minority political parties are much less likely to promote the rise of a 
single majority faction, and more likely to result in the sharing of power among multiple parties. 
Second, regardless of political congruence between agents, component institutions 
influence whether a constitutional agent will tend to be focused on providing policy with a 
national, public focus or targeted toward narrow constituencies. Here, while presidents’ national 
electoral constituency generally favors a public goods orientation,
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 assemblies may be 
composed of deputies largely focused on targeted policy, depending on the electoral and career 
incentives they face. These incentives further influence the collective dilemmas faced by 
legislators and the resultant delegation choices – for example, to party leaders or to the president.  
The structural determinants of these incentives we call the intraparty dimension of electoral 
institutions. Some electoral rules generate a powerful incentive for legislators (and legislative 
candidates) to hew close to the party line, while others generate an incentive to articulate what 
they personally can offer their voters as individual representatives. Other things equal, more 
party-centered rules favor greater representation of national concerns, while more personalistic 
(or candidate-centered) rules favor greater focus on local interests. 
In what follows, we demonstrate how neo-Madisonian theories of constitutional design, 
electoral systems and executive-legislative relations have prompted a significant rethinking of 
Latin American institutions, and have sharpened our understanding of how Latin American 
countries’ politics differ from the United States and countries in other parts of the world, as well 
as from one another.  Several themes are emphasized in the cross-national research contributing 
to this literature, as well as in the Latin American case studies we highlight. The first is that of a 
disaggregative approach to the study of institutions.  In keeping with the principles expounded 
above, recent work has strived to move beyond broad characterizations of institutions toward 
emphasizing the variation within traditional typologies of regime and electoral system, as well as 
the interaction between these component institutions. The second theme of the neo-Madisonian 
literature is that of a largely deductive analysis of political actors within a strategic context 
shaped by institutions.  These themes, we argue, are brought together explicitly or implicitly by 
the use of a delegation analogy in which the incentives facing democratic agents explains the 
nature of transactional or hierarchical relationships among those agents and, therefore, 
accountability to the electorate.        
Studying constitutional design in Latin America: a brief recent history 
 Before reviewing some of the major recent works and their contributions to the neo-
Madisonian enterprise, we should first take a step back and briefly trace the history of the study 
of interbranch relations in Latin American democracies, and why this topic of study has become 
central to a broader understanding of democracy in the region.  
 Juan Linz’s work on the “perils of presidentialism” provided much of the foundation for 
the study of democratic institutions in Latin America. Not because it was the first—other studies 
of executives and legislatures existed (as reviewed by Mainwaring 1990)—but because it 
elaborated a novel perspective on certain pathologies in the interactions of executives and 
legislators and their consequences for democracy itself. Linz argued that presidential systems 
were inherently prone to systemic failures, and his claims have been highly influential in 
interpreting Latin American democratic history. As such, its roots may be found in the wave of 
military coups in Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s, which cried out for explanations. 
Linz (1994:4) himself notes in his essay on presidentialism that the idea that interactions between 
legislatures and executives may threaten democracy came to him as he was working on the final 
drafts of what would become the chapters for The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Linz and 
Stepan 1978). Narratives by contributors on the political process in individual countries 
suggested to Linz that the competition between the separately elected presidents and legislatures 
in Latin America made more difficult the reconciliation of the deep social and political divisions 
that gripped much of the region in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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 Thus was the seed of Linz’s now 
well known argument that presidentialism was an inferior form of democracy because of its 
“dual democratic legitimacies” (i.e. separate agency relations of executive and legislature to 
voters) and rigidity (i.e. absence of hierarchy between branches). 
The question of the relationship of the presidential–parliamentary dichotomy to 
democratic regime stability has never been settled, and the debate continues.
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 The discussion of 
the wholesale ‘effects of presidentialism’ is fundamentally limited, though, with regard to 
research on Latin America, where presidentialism is present regionwide.  As a result, a primary 
agenda for institutionalists since the early 1990s has been to disaggregate presidentialism, though 
not to look at component institutions in isolation in the vein of much pre-Linzian work. This 
agenda has instead focused on two central issues: first, precisely accounting for the structure of 
the separation of powers across Latin America and elsewhere; and, second, understanding what 
institutions interact with the separation of powers to drive political actors toward widely varying 
outcomes among presidential regimes. A generation of multi-case works and case studies has 
drawn on the neo-Madisonian ideas we sketched above to explain why some presidential systems 
function like virtual dictatorships, while other presidents are regularly stymied in their efforts to 
change policy, and why still other presidential systems more closely approximate the balance of 
powers seen in the US. 
Constitutional Design 
Presidentialism creates dual democratic agents with two basic features: separate origin (a 
directly-elected chief executive) and separate survival (independent terms of office) (Shugart and 
Carey 1992).  Each agent in a stylized presidential regime is vertically accountable to a collective 
principal—the electorate.  Each institutional feature surrounding their political origins, along 
with each presidential and legislative prerogative, alters the transactional relationship between 
those agents by determining their goals and available strategies within interbranch relations.  The 
crucial distinction is whether presidential powers are proactive and geared toward changing the 
status quo via decrees and legislative introduction, or reactive and geared toward maintaining the 
status quo through vetoes (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997).   
From this starting point, understanding the interaction between constitutional agents from 
a neo-Madisonian perspective requires an accounting of incentives facing legislatures. 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), and contributing chapters, emphasize the importance of the 
legislative party system in shaping the president’s de facto power. At the extreme, the party 
system can generate a hierarchical relationship between branches regardless of the formal powers 
of the president.  Weldon (1997) shows through such analysis that even the ostensibly powerful 
executive in Mexico under the former hegemony of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) was largely dependent upon the legislative party system. That is, Mexico's presidential 
influence depended not upon the executive’s authority over lawmaking—which, in fact, has long 
been sharply limited—but upon the presence within the legislature of a disciplined majority, 
headed by the president.  In this extreme case, the subservient legislators acted primarily as 
agents of the party leadership and, therefore, of the president (Casar 2002).
14
 Thus the formally 
transactional relationship between separately elected executive and legislative institutions was 
transformed into a de facto hierarchy, with the president, rather than intra-legislative leaders, 
acting as the “whip” who maintained unity among his party in congress. Few cases in Latin 
America have reached the extreme of presidential dominance over legislators as seen in the 
classical Mexican situation. However, there have been some parallels elsewhere, and we will 
discuss some of them below. 
By contrast, similar analyses of presidents in Brazil and Colombia have emphasized that, 
while deriving significant legislative influence from their formidable constitutional powers, they 
face considerable difficulty in obtaining support on national policy from within the assembly 
(Mainwaring 1997, Archer and Shugart 1997). In these cases, antitheses to Mexico, legislatures 
have often blocked presidential policy initiatives, and forced presidents to transact with them, or 
encouraged them to bypass the congress and rule in an “imperial” manner (Cox and Morgenstern 
2002). By understanding the incentives facing legislators to submit to, bargain with, or obstruct 
presidents we can make sense of variations in executive power in the region.  
One potential ‘peril’ of presidential democracy – executive decree authority – provides a 
useful example in the distinction between constitutional and delegated decree authority (Carey 
and Shugart 1998). The former relates to constitutional design, where provisions allowing 
presidents to make policy by decree interacts with other constitutional features, notably the veto 
power, as well as with the partisan balance in the assembly—points further elaborated by 
Shugart (1998) and Negretto (2004). Delegated decree authority, however, by which the 
legislature grants temporary or restricted authority to the president, may be tolerated or even 
preferred by assemblies seeking to overcome internal collective action problems. Decrees under 
such delegated authority, from this perspective, differ fundamentally from those arrogated in a 
truly unilateral fashion (e.g. Fujimori’s “calling out the tanks” in a coup against congress and the 
judiciary in 1992).  
A given instance of interbranch transaction, Cox and Morgenstern (2001) argue, can be 
compared to a bilateral veto game. Even when legislatures are primarily reactive and face 
presidents with control of the legislative agenda, the anticipation of legislative reaction 
nevertheless mediates policy outcomes.  Presidents who have significant constitutional powers 
may choose unilateral actions, such as decrees, or “integrative” powers like forcing “urgent” 
consideration of legislation, or the appointment of partisan ministers who may command 
legislative support for the executive. The choice of strategy depends not only on formal powers 
but also upon the political circumstances within the legislature—which vary across both time and 
space.
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 Amorim Neto (2006, 2002a), for example, emphasizes Brazilian and other presidents' 
evolving use of an integrative power—the allocation of cabinet portfolios in coalition building—
in achieving legislative goals.  Nacif (2002) explains how in Mexico, since the PRI lost its 
majority in 1997, the president has shifted toward a coalitional strategy.  
 The circumstances shaping presidential strategies and “partisan powers” revolve around 
two crucial neo-Madisonian themes: (1) the extent to which the president's political supporters 
control the legislature, driven by what we call the interparty dimension of electoral institutions; 
and (2) the extent to which the legislature is characterized by parochial, versus national, 
concerns, driven by what we call intraparty dimension of electoral institutions and party 
organization.
16
 These factors ultimately characterize the transactional relationship we have 
outlined: whether a president prefers to pursue a coalitional or imperial/unilateral strategy, 
dominates the legislature or is rendered ineffectual – each with far-reaching consequences for 
policy outcomes and democratic representation. Put another way, institutions connected to these 
factors determine the likely degree of “separation of purpose” between the dual agents of the 
electorate (Cox and McCubbins 2001, Shugart and Haggard 2001, Samuels and Shugart 2003).  
Understanding the manner in which institutional incentives promote an alignment or 
divergence of preferences between constitutional agents has therefore been central to the neo-
Madisonian contribution to the study of Latin American politics.  In the following sections, we 
review the state of the literature regarding both the interparty and intraparty dimensions of 
electoral institutions that shape the political goals, policy focus, and career ambitions of 
legislators. We then turn to an exploration of systems that are “extreme” on one or both 
dimensions, including several of the largest and most-studied countries in Latin America. As we 
conclude, we discuss the possibility of a dynamic theory of institutions from the neo-Madisonian 
perspective as well as several research frontiers. 
Component institutions: the Interparty Dimension 
 Undoubtedly, research on the effects of electoral systems on legislative parties and on 
partisan competition more generally has been one of the most fruitful explorations associated 
with the study of political institutions.  Electoral systems for legislators vary significantly across 
democracies, including in Latin America. Rules for electing executives, on the other hand, vary 
much less. With, until recently, the exception of Bolivia, all Latin American presidents are 
directly elected,
17
 and because all presidencies in the region are currently unipersonal,
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 the 
electoral methods are necessarily majoritarian (winner take all). There is variation in the 
determination of winners, however, with the principal variation being between plurality and 
majority-runoff methods.
19
 This variation has spawned a literature on its effects on party 
systems, the election of politicians who are “outsiders” (i.e. not affiliated with an established 
party), and other factors (Kenney 2003; Jones 1995, 1999, 2004; Shugart and Taagepera 1994).  
Notwithstanding the impact of presidential-election methods on political outcomes of 
interest, the bulk of the literature focuses on legislative electoral systems and party systems. 
Much of the literature on institutional performance and democracy in Latin America has focused 
on party-system fragmentation and interparty competition. This literature has contributed not 
only to our understanding of regional variations in political incentives and outcomes, but also to 
general comparative theory.  In one of the best examples of this work, Geddes’ (1994) now 
classic analysis of civil-service reforms centers on the equal access to patronage generated by 
partisan parity in legislative representation and the collective action this enables.  In part, then, 
hers is a theory of the interparty dimension of electoral incentives that can encourage or 
discouraging legislative fragmentation, which in turn undermines or facilitates collective action.  
A large literature in comparative politics has been devoted to the role of electoral systems 
in accounting for variations in the fragmentation of national party systems.
20
  One particularly 
robust finding concerns the central role of district magnitude (the number of seats in an electoral 
district) in influencing the national number of parties and candidates (Rae 1967, Taagepera & 
Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994) and electoral coordination at the district level (Cox 1997).  In Latin 
America, these core conclusions of the electoral systems literature derived from established 
(usually parliamentary) democracies have had less explanatory value by themselves. Jones 
(1993), for example, has confirmed the greater proportionality of higher district magnitudes in 
the region,  yet the impact of the electoral system on the number of parties is limited.  Generally, 
the variation across the relatively high district magnitudes of most Latin American systems 
explains only a small part of political parties' relative sizes. Studies specifically on party 
development in Latin America have therefore focused more on variations in social cleavage 
structures (e.g. Coppedge 1997) or party-society relations (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995). 
Research on the interparty dimension of Latin American institutions in the neo-Madisonian 
tradition has also looked beyond formula and district magnitude to explain how other institutions 
interact with the electoral system to affect the voter and party behavior driving the size and 
number of legislative parties, particularly the president's contingent.   
Research on Latin American institutions, underscoring the importance of factors other 
than formula and district magnitude in influencing interparty relationships, has extended the very 
notion of "electoral system" to include a range of additional influences on behavior. For 
example, research has focused on the electoral cycle and particularly on the impact of concurrent 
presidential and assembly elections. Shugart (1995) finds, for example, that the extent to which a 
legislature is both supportive of the president and nationally oriented depends to a large degree 
on the electoral cycle.
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 The later a congressional election is held during a president’s term, the 
more likely the legislature will be dominated by opposition parties.  A similar relationship is 
suggested by Cheibub (2002) who shows that non-concurrent elections are associated with 
presidents whose own party is a minority in the legislature.  More generally, institutional 
configurations that increase fragmentation on the interparty dimension—including nonconcurrent 
elections—are associated with reduced legislative support for the president (Mainwaring 1993; 
Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Amorim Neto 2002; Cheibub 2002). 
  The interaction of national and subnational electoral institutions has also been critical to 
explaining differences on the interparty dimension across Latin American democracies, where 
regional politics contributes to the presence of larger numbers of parties in the national 
legislature than explained by district-level incentives alone—especially in federal systems.
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Samuels (1998) has shown for example that coattails associated with concurrent gubernatorial 
elections in Brazil contribute to variance in the number of parties competing in different states. 
As a result, while the effective number of parties in Brazil at the district level is moderate, the 
national “effective” number of parties
23
 is quite high.
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 Jones (1997), examining Argentina, 
similarly shows the concurrence of the gubernatorial and national legislative elections to be a 
strong influence on multipartism. Moreno (2003) demonstrates the presence of this interaction 
with subnational institutions throughout the region, regardless of formal federalism. These 
studies show for Latin American systems with subnational elections the importance of the extent 
to which the party system is “politywide” (Stepan 2001) and “integrated” (Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1997). The absence of a party system that coordinates both national and subnational 
elections produces significant fragmentation in the national legislature
.
 
Malapportionment interacts with these factors to “manufacture” legislative seat shares for 
parties by awarding larger numbers of seats per vote in some districts than in others within both 
upper and lower houses (Samuels and Snyder 2001).  Often, many less populated rural districts 
receive disproportionate shares of seats in the legislature, which may exacerbate incongruence 
between the president's political support and that of the legislature. A president can receive large 
number of votes from urban districts, while those same districts may have a relative disadvantage 
within the legislature due to malapportionment, as is the case in Brazil's most populous districts 
(Snyder and Samuels 2001).  Under other circumstances, malapportionment can also serve to 
enhance presidential support within the assembly. In the case of Argentina, Gibson et al. (2004) 
note that the Peronist coalition in the early 1990s, built with spending transfers, commanded not 
only a supermajority of the Senate, but a near-majority in the Chamber of Deputies representing 
provinces that accounted for only about 30 percent of the population. 
Component Institutions: the Intraparty Dimension  
The Personal Vote and Intraparty Competition 
It is impossible to characterize the incentives facing legislative parties considering only 
the interparty characteristics reviewed above. A legislative majority sharing the same party label 
as the president, for example, means little in the absence of some degree of internal party 
discipline or homogeneity, even if the president is the titular head of his own party.
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Increasingly, institutional analysis has focused on the incentives facing individual legislators to 
cultivate a personal reputation with voters rather than exploiting their association with a party 
label (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Katz 1986). Bringing this intraparty dimension to the 
fore has been essential to the development of neo-Madisonian theory. Carey and Shugart (1995) 
and Shugart (2001, 2005) present systematic evaluations of the individualizing incentives of 
various electoral systems based upon: (1) whether party leaders control access to the party label; 
(2) whether a party’s votes are pooled across multiple candidates running under the label; and (3) 
whether voters cast their votes for a list of candidates nominated by the party, or for individual 
candidates. To the extent that parties control access to the label, votes are pooled, and voters vote 
only for party lists, the electoral system may be seen as party-centered, as in closed-list 
proportional representation (PR). To the extent that some or all of these conditions do not hold, 
the rules are more candidate-centered. Examples include open-list PR, where votes are pooled at 
the party level, but voters may vote for individual candidates, rather than have to accept the list 
as a whole, and single nontransferable vote, in which no votes are pooled, and candidates gain 
representation entirely based on their own votes (i.e., there is no party list). 
The incentives for candidates under these rules are made even more diverse given 
variations in district magnitude. Under closed lists, where voters have no opportunity to favor the 
election of some candidates over others, higher magnitude means more candidates who may be 
elected without being identifiable in any way to voters. Such politicians owe their election much 
more to party leaders than to voters. However, with intraparty competition, higher magnitude 
generates more competitors within the party seeking votes, implying a higher premium on the 
distinct qualities of the candidate.  
A general characterization of intraparty competition and personal vote incentives has 
emerged. Candidate-centered rules are usually associated empirically and theoretically with less 
disciplined parties and politicians focused on targeted benefits for their constituents with which 
to enhance their personal electoral reputation. It would be a mistake, however, to read this 
literature as concluding that there is simply an inverse relationship between personal vote 
incentives and normative notions of public goods provision or proper party functioning.  To be 
sure, all else equal, party-centered rules are often associated with parties that have a more 
national focus. But at the extreme, “hyper-centralized” rules may sacrifice accountability of 
individual politicians to voters by prompting legislators to ignore constituent interests in favor of 
party leadership. Under such rules—closed lists and relatively high magnitudes—parties may 
have a tendency to become very top-heavy, with real political competition being centered among 
factions that have little connection to the electorate, but rather vie for control of the big “prize” 
of the powerful central party machinery.
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 Even more, extreme unity of purpose between a 
disciplined legislative majority and a co-partisan president undermines the logic of the separation 
of powers and endowing agents with countervailing interests—as the Mexican case under PRI 
hegemony shows most clearly.  
 
Theoretical development of the intraparty dimension 
We can conceptualize the two principal-agent relationships that are most relevant to the 
intraparty dimension as: (1) between voter-principals and legislators as agents, and (2) between 
legislators (as principals) and the extent to which they delegate to party leaders as their agents. 
Where the electoral rules are candidate-centered, voters would be more likely to demand 
information on specific candidates in order to be able to screen their potential agents of 
representation. On the other hand, where rules are party-centered, information on parties as 
collective agents of representation will be more valuable to voters than information on 
candidates, whose election prospects voters cannot affect other than by which party (as a whole) 
they favor (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). From the standpoint of legislators, we would 
expect the extent of their delegation to party leaders to be closely related to the personal or 
partisan incentives that they face. Where they face incentives to cultivate a personal vote, they 
are likely to delegate less central authority because of their need to highlight ways in which they 
differ from other candidates and from the party as a whole. On the other hand, the more 
determinative of their election prospects is the voters’ evaluation of the collective party 
reputation, the more politicians would have an incentive to delegate to leadership and reward that 
leadership for maintaining the public good of the party label.
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Increasingly, research on Latin American politics has given attention to these institutions 
and testing their effects on legislative behavior and executive-legislative relations. Crisp et al 
(2004), studying six Latin American democracies,
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 show that bills providing “targetable” 
benefits to a locality originate from deputies facing greater personal vote incentives and that 
higher district magnitudes intensify these incentives.
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  Comparing across the region, Nielson 
(2003) finds personal vote incentives to be associated with the maintenance of protectionist trade 
policy while Hallerberg and Marier (2004) find such an association with budget deficits. The 
connection between policy and intraparty factors has been highlighted in case studies. Eaton’s 
(2002) account of policy change Argentina, for example, suggests party-centered electoral rules 
in Argentina facilitated passage of Menem's economic reforms. Eaton argues that the Peronists’ 
legislative leaders from the various provinces—often at cross-purposes on other issues—saw the 
economic reforms as benefiting the party's overall reputation.  
These studies intend to account for the overall tendency of legislatures with a more 
parochial policy focus relative to other nations—and, importantly, relative to the president. 
Throughout the region and elsewhere, presidential incentives are taken to be relatively more 
national and policy-oriented (Geddes 1994, Shugart and Carey 1992, Shugart 1999, Moe 1990, 
Moe and Caldwell 1994). The logic is simply that presidents have a single national constituency, 
and must win a broad plurality or majority.
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 Legislatures, on the other hand, vary in the breadth 
of their constituencies and their incentives, in the manner discussed in this section. As we note 
below, however, this variance does not range from "good" to "bad" incentives.  Both intraparty 
extremes present distinct disadvantages. 
 
Variations across parties under a common electoral system 
As these general conclusions of personal vote seeking incentives emerge from a cross 
national perspective, case studies have sought to explain the within-system variation of actors’ 
response to those incentives.  In a given case, there are a number of factors mediating the 
connection between an electoral system’s intraparty incentives and the strategy pursued by a 
given set of political actors. Hence, different parties equilibrate differently depending upon the 
circumstances they face.  In Brazil, a prominent example of intra-country variation in party 
organization has been the behavior of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a party frequently 
noted as both programmatic and internally cohesive (Keck 1992, Mainwaring 1999) compared to 
other Brazilian parties despite facing the same electoral system. Samuels’ (1999) cross-party 
study shows that variation within Brazil can be explained by examining parties' internal rules, 
electoral alliances, access to patronage and to campaign-finance. Just as the PT is organized in a  
fashion contrary to Brazil’s systemic incentives for personalism, Crisp (1998) shows that in 
Venezuela the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) organized in a decentralized fashion 
notwithstanding the systemic incentives for highly concentrated party authority.  
A basic conclusion of work on the intraparty dimension is that the incentive structure of 
electoral rules establishes an environment in which some strategic choices by politicians and 
their collective organizations, parties, are more favored than others. Nonetheless, any complete 
theory of the intraparty dimension must admit the existence of multiple equilibria in terms of 
organizational form, even under a constant institutional context. If the ultimate principal is 
conceived to be the electorate, variations in preference profiles among voters should be expected 
to result in variations of organizational forms to attract the votes of constituents. We return to 
these themes in our case sketches below. 
Legislative ambition 
Understanding legislative ambition is a crucial piece of neo-Madisonian analysis, because 
it provides a key link between legislators’ electoral incentives and their incentive to engage in 
transactional or hierarchical relationships with the executive. Put starkly, if legislators do not 
have the ambition to remain in the legislature, they are unlikely to have interest in 
institutionalizing the body such that it can develop a collective interest in policy outcomes, on 
which it transacts with (and thus checks) the executive. Moreover, legislators with little interest 
in, or no eligibility for, reelection are unlikely to function as agents of their voters. The neo-
Madisonian insights explain why legislators have the ambition they have, and to whom they are 
accountable if not their current electorate, and what interests they have as legislators, if not to 
transact over policy with the executive. 
The clearest incentive for democratic agents is for them to be encouraged to seek 
continuing occupation of the office they hold, such that the threat of removal is a meaningful 
one. Shaping an agent's ambition means, in part, shaping their time horizon.
31
 The reelection 
motive or static ambition, a universal assumption in US legislative studies, is suggested by some 
as useful in Latin American politics (e.g. Ames 1987, Geddes 1994) and criticized as a 
misapplication by others (e.g. Weyland 2002).  From a neo-Madisonian perspective, career 
motives and their impact on time horizons are central questions in themselves.   
A straightforward incentive for legislative agents to “shirk” their apparent immediate 
principals derives from term limits. Carey’s (1996) case studies of Costa Rican and Venezuelan 
legislative career paths in the 1990s demonstrate that removing the prospect of reelection merely 
shifts their focus toward those who control post-legislative careers.
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 In terms of delegation and 
accountability, this endpoint imposed upon legislative agents induces shirking against 
constituents, shifting their loyalties toward presidents or party leaders or other extra-legislative 
actors capable of furthering their careers.  Term-limited deputies in Costa Rica have good 
prospects for continuing their political careers via presidential appointments if their party wins 
the presidency, prompting them to pursue particularistic policy to promote their party's general 
electoral gain.
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  In Venezuela, under similar electoral rules but without term limits, the careers 
of deputies tend to focus on the national legislature and deputies did not pursue constituency 
service.  Carey then applies these insights to the United States, demonstrating that even in the 
very context where the reelection assumption emerged, legislators aspiring to statewide office 
exhibit changes in voting patterns in accordance with those progressive goals.
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More generally, an agent's incentive structure is always shaped by factors external to 
their immediate relationship to the principal, shifting their efforts toward other potential 
principals.
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  Even without term limits, legislators will consider opportunities available 
subsequent to their current office. Samuels (2003) examination of career paths in 1990s Brazil, 
suggests that Brazil's federal structure fundamentally alters both legislative career motivations 
and policy preferences. In a context where state actors, notably governors, wield considerable 
subnational power over resources and political fates, many deputies, he finds, leave after short 
national legislative careers to pursue state and local office. The effects of state-centric careers, by 
Samuel’s account, extend to strategies of gubernatorial electoral alliances and pork-barreling 
designed to strengthen relationships with powerful state-level actors.
36
   
Features of legislative institutionalization such as committees and seniority rules vary 
with such factors as the extent of legislators' desire to advertise and claim credit for legislation in 
seeking reelection as well as parties’ internal tools for rewards and sanctions (Mayhew 1974, 
Cox and McCubbins 1993) . When the national legislature is not a career zenith or legislators are 
highly dependent upon local party leaders, incentives for professionalizing and institutionalizing 
the national legislature may be quite limited.  Such was the case in the United States prior to 
party centralization in the mid-19th century (see e.g. Kernell 1977), and remains so in several 
Latin American assemblies where reelection rates range from somewhat lower than the present 
U.S. House to zero (Morgenstern 2002). In Argentina, the provincial focus of party nominations, 
along with the president’s decree power, has devalued the status of federal legislative careers, 
which in turn has worked against the institutionalization of the legislature (Jones et al 2002). In 
Mexico the prohibition on consecutive terms similarly produces very little incentive to 
institutionalize the assembly (Weldon 2002). Conversely, Morgenstern (2002) explains that the 
Chilean legislature has more static ambition than others in the region and, accordingly, is one of 
the most institutionalized, with a leadership and committee system designed to serve members' 
reelection efforts. These studies suggest that the development of strong legislative institutions 
may be associated with legislator’s incentive to pursue reelection independent of presidents and 
party leaders.  
The Dimensions of Majority Faction: Extreme systems  
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be 
prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, 
by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of 
oppression 
 - Madison in “Federalist 10” 
 
If a single party managed to obtain a legislative majority and provide its elected 
legislators no incentive to cater to local interests of constituents, the result would be precisely the 
“majority faction” that Madison and his colleagues feared. If that majority also captured the 
executive, the transactional system of checks and balances would be effectively rendered 
meaningless. Alternatively, if the legislature was incapable of organizing itself for a collective 
nationally-oriented purpose, it would not transact with the executive on a co-equal basis. In 
either scenario, legislators have an incentive to abdicate the formal autonomy of their branch to 
the executive. Legislatures that lack interest in national policy will permit the executive to take 
the initiative--for example, by decrees—on programmatic matters while seeking ad hoc 
legislative support with narrow rewards such as patronage for deputies' regions and personal 
networks. In the remainder of this section, we use several examples to highlight “extreme” 
patterns of representations that can hinder transactional relations 
 Much of the insight into the incentives politicians within a given institution will have 
with respect to other institutions stems from the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974). The way 
in which executives and legislators are elected is crucial for the incentives of agents to cooperate 
or engage in conflict. It should be noted here that “conflict” need not a bad thing, for the very 
idea of ambition counteracting ambition requires some degree of conflict. Not all conflict is 
deadlock, nor is all deadlock regime-threatening. Many conflicts are resolved via transactions 
between the agents, or by the voters themselves at the next election. Others are overcome via 
constitutional provisions for unilateral action (e.g., decrees, veto overrides). The neo-Madisonian 
framework offers insights into the conditions under which conflict can generate deadlock, which 
may threaten democracy itself. 
 As we noted in the previous sections, the incentives of legislators can be understood with 
respect to two dimensions of representation—interparty and intraparty. Here we extend the logic 
of the two dimensions to develop a notion of “extreme” systems that can be theoretically 
expected to skew legislative incentives away from a desire to transact with the executive over 
national policy-making. Each dimension provides a continuum from highly fragmented to highly 
concentrated. On the interparty dimension, high fragmentation implies a very high effective 
number of political parties competing in elections and jockeying for influence in the national 
legislature. High concentration implies not only a majority party, but a relatively unassailable 
one, either because the opposition is fragmented or because the electoral system is biased in 
favor of the majority.  
 Moreover, in the case of presidential systems, high concentration of overall political 
authority is achieved in the interparty dimension if and only if the legislative majority also 
controls the presidency. On the intraparty dimension, high concentration occurs only if the 
president is the head of his own party. If either of these conditions is absent, high concentration 
may apply within the legislature, but not across branches. If the concentration of authority does 
not attain its apex on both dimensions in the presidency, then there still exists room for 
differences of ambition, and hence either transactions or deadlock, between president and 
assembly. 
We follow the terminology introduced by Shugart (2001) and refer to the extreme 
fragmentation as hyper-representative, a term that refers to the relative ease with which minority 
parties may obtain legislative representation, aided by electoral-system features such as high 
proportionality and low thresholds. Extreme concentration on the interparty dimension is a 
pluralitarian system, implying a high degree of concentration of authority in the largest 
minority.
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 A hyper-representative system implies that the emergence of any given majority is 
unlikely, due to high fragmentation. Politics in such a setting is likely to take the form of shifting 
ad hoc coalitions, rather than stable majority formation, and the president’s party is typically well 
short of a majority. A pluralitarian system implies that a single party holding the presidency is 
capable of ruling alone, especially when based upon a minority of votes or when an alternative 
majority is unlikely. More moderate locations on the interparty continuum imply a more 
balanced competition, whereby multiple parties may coalesce behind a common national 
purpose, or the majority may shift from election to election. 
 On the intraparty dimension, the continuum also runs from fragmented to concentrated, in 
terms of individual legislator’s freedom to articulate their personal attachments to localities or 
blocs of voters, on the one hand, or are subordinated to national leadership of their parties, on the 
other hand. A high degree of intraparty fragmentation is hyper-personalistic, implying that the 
personal reputations and entrepreneurial activities of specific politicians dominate the electoral 
and legislative process. At the extreme, parties, as such, may not exist, or may be empty shells 
that provide little meaningful coordination of legislators. The opposite end of the intraparty 
dimension is characterized by hyper-centralization in the hands of national party leaders—
including the president in the case of his own party—such that individual legislators have little 
scope to represent the specific interests of local constituents or to highlight personal attributes or 
policy views that set them apart from their party. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the interparty and intraparty dimensions, with the location of selected 
Latin American countries, plus the US, indicated impressionistically.
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 Different indices could be 
developed to scale countries at any given time on these axes, although we shall not present or 
defend any particular quantitative expression for the placement of countries in this review.
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 The 
location of a country in Figure 1 should be thought of as being an estimate of the placement of its 
median legislator,
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 with respect to the theoretical extremes. Several Latin American countries 
have approximated one of the extremes in this two dimensional space at some point in their 
recent histories. It is at the extremes that we expect the executive–legislative relationship to be 
most problematic, for one reason or another. As the arrows in the figure stemming from the 
country labels indicate, a country need not have a static location in this two-dimensional space. 
The dynamics of electoral competition may change the incentives of the median legislator by 
injecting new parties with distinct constituencies into the competitive mix or because some 
pressing national issue emerges that legislators cannot shirk. Changes in a country’s location 
may also result from electoral or other institutional reform, although it should be noted that 
reform itself is typically a product of changes in issue salience or patterns of party competition—
a point that we return to below. 
 We shall use one or more Latin American countries—and the literature on it that most 
represents the neo-Madisonian perspective—to illustrate each of the extremes and how the two 
dimensions of legislative representation affect the nature of executive–legislative politics. In 
each case, we will also consider how the dynamics of electoral competition and political reform 
result in changes in the position of a country in this two-dimensional space. 
 [Figure 1] 
Hyper-representative: Brazil 
 We begin with Brazil in part because it is the Latin American case for which the largest 
literature on institutions and representation has developed. Brazil’s fragmented multipartism 
places the country among those with the largest effective number of parties in the world. The 
Brazilian literature on institutional incentives, beginning with Mainwaring (1991), has also 
focused to a large degree on the personalistic nature of open-list PR, thus suggesting that the case 
also contains elements of our hyper-personalistic extreme. Ames’ (2001) study, perhaps the most 
focused on the open-list incentive in Brazil, shows that the resulting electoral strategies are 
manifest in concentrated support bases or efforts at dominance across several municipalities, 
which are then targeted in deputies' legislative efforts, which he conceptualizes as being highly 
individualistic and oriented towards reelection. 
 While not disputing the high degree of personalism in Brazil, we agree that studies that 
have emphasized personalism have downplayed the critical role that parties play in organizing 
the national legislature.
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 Thus, for illustrative purposes, the most noteworthy characteristic of 
representation in Brazil is not its personalism, but rather its multiparty and regionalized 
character, although both tendencies are clearly more prevalent than their opposite, as shown by 
our placement of Brazil in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 1. Personalism is less extreme than 
in Colombia, for example, and recent scholarship ascribes greater importance to parties and party 
discipline than implied by earlier literature (e.g. Figueiredo and Limongi 2000, Amorim Neto 
2002b).  
 We have just articulated the relatively static features of Brazilian electoral politics since 
the return to democracy. The open-list electoral system has remained unchanged, and the 
importance of state-level politics emphasized by Samuels (2003) and others
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 remains. However, 
other features of electoral competition—and thus legislative organization and executive–
legislative relations—have undergone changes. Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins (2003) have 
shown that the characterization of Brazil as a fluid multiparty system was accurate for some 
presidential administrations, but the more structured interpretation of Figuereido and Limongi 
has recently been more accurate. At its most fragmented, the Brazilian party system not only 
failed to produce a majority with a common collective purpose, but also permitted the election of 
an “outsider” president, Fernando Collor de Melo. Collor, seeing bleak prospects for gaining 
legislative majorities for his policy preferences through the ordinary statutory process, embarked 
on an “imperial” approach, emitting decrees, over which he negotiated with congressional party 
leaders only afterwards (Cox and Morgenstern 2002, Amorim Neto 2002a). In other cases, 
presidents have pursued a statutory strategy building sufficiently broad support from their own 
party in coalition with allied parties to and facilitate the passage of the agreed agenda (Amorim 
Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003).  
 The emergence of legislative “cartels” has been accompanied by changes in both the 
interparty and intraparty dimensions. After a series of nonconcurrent presidential and legislative 
elections in the decade after the end of military rule, in 1994 elections were concurrent. As 
expected in the literature on electoral cycles (Shugart 1995, Jones 1997, Samuels 2000), 
concurrent elections helped build a majority in congress for the various parties aligned with 
incoming president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. During his term, congress passed a 
constitutional amendment to permit immediate reelection of the president—a change that was 
itself largely motivated by conservative politicians’ fears that they did not have a viable 
alternative to the leftist leader, Luiz Igancio ‘Lula’ da Silva, other than the incumbent Cardoso. 
A concomitant change in the presidential term from five years to four resulted in the 
entrenchment of concurrent elections. The national focus of a reelection bid by an incumbent 
president and the linking of the campaigns for the two branches are two factors that would be 
expected to increase concentration on both dimensions. Presidential “coattails” would result in 
an increased representation for the president’s party, and legislators would be more likely to be 
held accountable for their support or opposition to the president. These changes appear to have 
taken place in Brazil since the beginning of the first Cardoso presidency,
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 and thus we show 
Brazil as making modest moves towards a more moderate placement on both dimensions. 
  
Pluralitarian: Mexico before 1997 
 The Mexican case shows what results when concentration on the interparty dimension 
becomes extreme. A single majority faction, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, dominated 
Mexican politics for decades, resulting in no effective competition. Moreover, the party was 
highly disciplined and the president was almost always the unchallenged leader of the party, 
rendering the legislature subservient (Cox and Morgenstern 2002).
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 In Figure 1 we show 
Mexico as well to the concentrated end of the interparty dimension, owing to the lack of a viable 
alternative to the PRI throughout most of its years of control. We also show Mexico in the 
concentrated half of the intraparty dimension, though less extreme than the Venezuelan case. 
The president as national party leader clearly dominated the behavioral calculus of majority-
party legislators, but local PRI candidates were given more autonomy in their management of 
district-level campaigns and were more tied to their localities than often recognized (Langston 
2001). Were it not for the ban on immediate congressional reelection, it is unlikely that party 
discipline would have been so high (Weldon 2002). 
 We show the Mexican system in the Salinas era moving in a more concentrated direction 
in both dimensions of Figure 1. The shift farther towards the pluralitarian extreme represents the 
electoral system provision that was in effect in 1991 and 1994 that effectively would have 
guaranteed the PRI a majority in congress even had it fallen well below 50% of the votes 
(Molinar and Weldon 2001), the very essence of pluralitarian outcomes. The upward shift 
represents the tighter alignment of the president with his party as Salinas exercised a sharply 
increased involvement in the affairs of the party.
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 However, since the PRI lost its majority in 
1997, Mexico has moved sharply away from interparty concentration, as three-party competition 
has become established. Mexican congressional elections also appear to have undergone an 
increasing personalization, as more competitive elections have given parties the incentive to 
nominate candidates with attractive personal qualities and experience in the single-member 
districts (Diaz 2004). Moreover, central coordination over state-level parties has decreased 
somewhat with greater interparty competition (Langston 2003). Nonetheless, Mexican parties 
remain relatively centralized, and probably will remain so as long as immediate reelection for 
congress is banned and party leaders continue to control access to the most attractive post-
legislative opportunities, such as nominations for other offices. 
 The Mexican case is especially instructive for the relationship of congress members’ 
personal career incentives to the extent of hierarchical or transactional relations with the 
executive. As already noted, the pre-1997 era was the paradigmatic case of hierarchy, with the 
members of the PRI congressional majority bound to the national party leadership—personified 
in each sexenio by the president—through its control over nominations and the distribution of 
post-legislative patronage. However, the relationship of the executive and legislative branches 
changed dramatically once the PRI lost its majority in 1997, and then the presidency in 2000. In 
the absence of a majority, disciplined in support of the president as party leader, suddenly 
Mexico had the conditions for the classic countervailing ambitions theorized by the Federalists. 
Presidents found themselves having to negotiate with congress to enact a legislative program. 
Given the relatively national incentives of members of congress, the substance of these 
transactions is largely policy concessions, not patronage and pork. 
Hyper-centralized:  Venezuela 
 The Venezuelan case is a nearly ideal-typical example of hyper-centralized intraparty 
relations. Venezuelan legislators from 1958 to 1988 were elected from closed lists in relatively 
large multimember districts. The main party organizations themselves were highly centralized, 
with national party committees empowered through the party rules to substitute and rearrange 
candidates on the lists submitted by state-level party chapters. As a result of these features, there 
was minimal incentive for legislators to pay attention to local or state interests, or to be known 
and active among their constituents, as the literature on Venezuela noted (Coppedge 1994, Crisp 
and Rey 2001, Martz 1992). 
 The party system was nominally competitive, and most comparative analysts classified 
Venezuela as a two-party system.  However, as various students of Venezuela (Levine 1973, 
Crisp 2000) have observed, the two main parties, AD and COPEI were in fact more collusive 
than competitive.
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 Their first priority was to maintain the regime, defined not only as a system 
of regular elections but also as one in which party-affiliated interest groups were granted direct 
access to executive-branch decision-making through what Crisp (2000) calls consultative 
commissions. With individual legislators having the personal incentive to toe the party line, and 
with party leaders bent on maintaining the collusive and consultative features of the system, the 
legislature was mostly inactive. Indeed, it was another case of a subservient legislature, but of a 
different character than Mexico’s. Whereas the Mexican congress under the hegemony of the 
PRI was active in passing statues, albeit with minimal or no amendments to the president’s 
proposals, the Venezuelan legislature regularly delegated decree authority to the executive or 
simply acquiesced in its being bypassed by the executive’s consultative commissions.
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 As the party system imploded in the 1990s, Venezuela drifted towards a hyper-
representative situation, with a rapid and extreme increase in the effective number of parties. 
Unlike the case of Brazil, however, these parties remained nationally focused, and with some 
exceptions, quite centralized. During this time, with a minority president and a fragmented 
legislature, executive–legislative relations were at their most combative
48
 in Venezuelan history 
(see the review in Crisp 2000). Around the same time, the electoral system was reformed, to 
allow about half of the lower house to be elected in single-member districts. This reform was 
explicitly justified as a means of decentralizing the parties, which were recognized in official 
discourse as too top-heavy (Crisp and Rey 2001).
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 However, we show the impact on the 
intraparty dimension as having been minimal, because, as Crisp and Rey (2001) explain, no 
changes were made to the centralized organizational structures of the main parties themselves. 
The failure of the Venezuelan system to respond to the intense popular discontent of the 1990s 
led to the rise of Hugo Chávez Frias, which we depict as having moved Venezuela back in a 
more concentrated position on both dimensions. 
Hyper-Personalistic: Colombia 
 A paradigmatic example of personal vote seeking incentives in Latin America existed in 
the "personal list" system used for congressional elections in Colombia through 2002.  Without 
vote pooling at the party level, this system operated in a fashion similar to the single non-
transferable vote, once used in Japan (Cox and Shugart 1995).  The two main parties (Liberal and 
Conservative) that regularly elected multiple legislators in most districts generally had each of 
their legislators elected from a separate list. Likewise, smaller parties’ lists generally failed to 
elect more than one member in any electoral district, even in the 100-seat senate district 
established in 1991. As a consequence, electoral lists in Colombia have been primarily vehicles 
for individual candidacies, creating a highly competitive environment within parties that 
reinforce weak legislative parties and the maintenance of clientelist networks to deliver support 
(Archer and Shugart 1997, Nielson and Shugart 1999, Crisp and Desposato 2004).
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 After the enactment of a new constitution in 1991, the trend was towards greater and 
greater intraparty fragmentation. The trend briefly was also in the direction of interparty 
concentration, as the Liberal party’s greater ability to manage the division of its votes across its 
multiple lists allowed it to maintain congressional majorities even when it fell below 50% of the 
House vote in 1998. In March, 2002, however, a stunning fractionalization of the congressional 
election followed, as many traditional and “independent” politicians alike began to jettison the 
old party labels in favor of new ones, some of which allied with independent presidential 
candidate Alvaro Uribe. Thus we depict Colombia as of 2002 as significantly fragmented; 
however, it would not be correct to characterize the outcome as hyper-representative, because the 
congress inaugurated after Uribe’s victory in May divided into two clearly opposed camps. This 
national policy cleavage, unusual in the context of a hyper-personalistic system, facilitated the 
passage of a reform of the electoral system to a variant of party-list PR. The new system 
engendered some concentration on both dimensions in the 2006 election, as depicted in Figure 
1.
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Nationally-Oriented Multipartism  
 Latin America has given us little experience with interparty fragmentation combined with 
intraparty concentration (the upper left of Figure 1). At its extreme, this would represent 
multiparty competition in the absence of stable coalitions amongst the parties (i.e., hyper-
representative), with the major parties having very concentrated authority at the national level 
(i.e. hyper-centralized). Such a combination is likely to be present only in the case of rather 
intense division along ideological grounds, given that, by definition, such a combination means 
that the multiple parties are not driven by primarily local or regional considerations. Thus this 
quadrant may represent one of the closest approximations to the nightmare scenarios of deadlock 
envisioned by Cheibub (2002) and dual democratic legitimacies, as famously articulated by Linz 
(1994). Indeed, Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s represent one of the prime examples to have 
been in this quadrant over a sustained period. For the decades prior to the 1960s, Valenzuela 
(1978) and Siavelis (1999) indicate, Chile had an ideologically diverse party system, but conflict 
was tempered by the importance politicians attached to local constituency service, for which they 
often were willing to work across the partisan divide. Thus we depict Chile prior to the 1960s as 
moderate on the intraparty dimension, while quite extreme on the interparty dimension. In the 
1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, partisan lines hardened and divisive national issues 
dominated congressional politics in their dealings with a president with significant legislative 
authority. The effective number of parties actually declined, but the former moderation provided 
by local service also declined.
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 As we noted previously, Venezuela had brief experience with a configuration represented 
by the upper left of Figure 1 in the 1990s, but it was never a sustained feature of that system.
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Shortly after the election of Chávez in 1998, Venezuelan politics came to be markedly 
dominated by a single political force, as depicted in Figure 1. Among current systems, El 
Salvador is the most extreme combination within this quadrant, with a multiparty system in 
which the two larges parties have tended each to have around a third of the vote and legislative 
seats. Indications are that the major parties are highly centralized (Wood 2005: 197), and while 
the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) has moderated its ideology since the 
end of the civil war, the leftist ex-guerrilla Farabundo Martin Front for National Liberation 
(FMLN) mostly has not (Ryan 1997). The result has been a rather polarized legislature, although 
it has remained “workable” in Cox and Morgenstern’s (2002) sense, presumably because all 
post-war presidents have also been from ARENA, and smaller conservative and centrist parties 
have been able to build coalitions with ARENA.
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 Thus the Salvadoran case is almost certainly 
the closest current approximation to the twin extremes of multipartism and centralization. As 
such, it suggests the promise of such a configuration to produce national policy-oriented 
transactions and to avoid the pitfalls of either legislative subservience to the executive or 
dominance of pork-barrel politics. However, it also embodies the ever-present danger of 
polarization, especially if an unreformed left were to win the presidency.
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Moderate systems: Post-Pinochet Chile, post-1997 Mexico, and Costa Rica 
 Near the center of Figure 1 we have systems that obtain moderate scale positions on both 
the interparty and intraparty dimensions. These are the systems that are most likely to deliver the 
mix of incentives that bring about a legislature interested in transacting with the executive over 
national policy. It is important to emphasize that we are not arguing that there is one 
configuration that is normatively ideal; indeed, as we shall see, the various systems that we 
identify as approximating the middle range differ in important respects from one another. 
Moreover, surely each has its own flaws. Nonetheless, the middle range positions exhibit many 
of the conditions that Madison and his colleagues spoke of in the Federalist papers. 
 Before returning to the Latin American cases, let us recount the features of US 
institutions and legislative incentives that give it a middle positioning.  On the intraparty 
dimension, the US is obviously more personalistic than the closed list PR systems with 
centralized parties, yet nevertheless depends to a larger degree upon party reputation compared 
to systems with high degrees of intraparty competition. On the interparty dimension, the two 
parties are closely balanced in electoral support and congressional representation. Since around 
1990, in most elections the largest party has had somewhat less than half of the votes for 
president, congress, or both (Shugart 2004: 645), and for this reason we depict the current 
position of the United States as being somewhat to the pluralitarian side on the interparty 
dimension. While the position of the US is not static, it also probably varies less over time than 
many of the Latin American cases depicted.
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 Among the Latin American cases, it is no accident that the country often characterized as 
the most successful democracy in the region is one of the few to be found near the middle of 
Figure 1. Costa Rica has had two major and a few smaller parties represented in a congress that 
has been generally workable, as illustrated by the economic reforms in the 1990s (Wilson 1998). 
Sometimes the president’s party has been short of a majority in the unicameral legislature, and 
even in the one case of fully divided government (i.e. an opposition majority) policy-making 
appears to have been relatively smooth. On the other hand, even when the president’s party has 
been in the majority, the congress has seldom approximated the subservience that we saw in the 
Mexican case, or in Venezuela. Costa Rican legislators, like their Mexican counterparts, are 
constitutionally ineligible for immediate reelection. Yet the outcomes in terms of executive–
legislative relations have been very different from Mexico under PRI hegemony. Carey (1997) 
shows that members, unable to pursue ongoing careers in congress, look to the leader of their 
party for guidance. As in Mexico, this leader is external to the legislature, but unlike in Mexico, 
the leader is not always the incumbent president; it may be the party’s candidate for the 
upcoming presidential election, selected in a competitive process. Thus the reelection ban for 
legislators that was seen to contribute to the concentration of authority in Mexico has contributed 
to interbranch transactional relations in Costa Rica—an important reminder that the effects of 
any one institution cannot be understood without considering the context of the others with 
which it interacts. 
 Chile after the end of the Pinochet regime is another example of balanced incentives, 
derived to a significant degree from the unusual electoral system. Chile has developed a high 
level of congressional careerism (Morgenstern 2002) and probably the most professionalized 
congress, measured by such indicators as committee specialization (Carey 2002). Chile’s unique 
system of two-seat districts and open-list PR, engineered by the outgoing authoritarian 
government to provide an advantage for the Rightist coalition, was presumed to promote 
centrism and two-party competition.  At the district level, the system promotes candidate 
positioning on either side of the median voter (Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels 1998). At the 
national level, legislative parties coordinate across districts by coalescing into two cohesive and 
broad multiparty alliances (Carey 2002). Because of the open-list system, candidates must 
cultivate ties to their constituencies. Yet, because the alliances centrally determine which of their 
component parties will contest which districts as well as who the candidates themselves will be, 
the personal-vote incentives are restrained. For this reason, we depict Chile’s current system as 
quite close to the middle of the intraparty dimension. The result thus far has been a workable 
congress and coalitional presidents, though the presence of extraordinary constitutional powers 
and nonconcurrent elections looms as a potential source of conflict between these nationally 
oriented actors (Siavelis 2002). 
 Finally, Mexico since 1997—the year the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies—exhibits many of the conditions for a workable transactional relationship with the 
executive. As we noted above—and as Weldon (1997) predicted—the linchpin of presidential 
dominance in Mexico was the control of congress by a disciplined majority party of which the 
president was the head. The relationship between the president and the congressional party 
leadership was already weakening under the first three years of Zedillo’s presidency (1994–97), 
but when the PRI lost its majority at the midterm elections, the relationship between the branches 
changed fundamentally (Nacif 2002), resulting in a president needing to negotiate with 
opposition parties.  Because the dominance of the president had depended on his partisan 
powers, not on constitutional powers, the president was suddenly placed in a markedly weaker 
position. Given that the substantially reduced majoritarianism of the post-1996 electoral system 
facilitates three-party competition, this pattern is likely to remain for some time. However, given 
the continued absence of congressional reelection, parties remain considerably centralized, and 
the professionalization of congress lags (Nacif 2002). 
Endogenous Evolution? Towards a Dynamic Theory 
 Our discussion of relatively extreme systems showed that the position of a country on the 
two dimensions of representation depicted in Figure 1 is not static. Here we will attempt to arrive 
at a synthesis that points the way towards theoretical extensions that could shed light on political 
dynamics. Extreme systems, Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) argue, have an inherent tendency to 
generate systemic failure.
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 We can think of a systemic failure as a series of pathological 
outcomes resulting from the logic of political incentives in an extreme system. By “pathological” 
we mean problems in the functioning of principal-agent relations of representation, perceived as 
such by a substantial enough portion of the electorate so as to generate pressures towards change, 
either endogenously or exogenously.  
 The source for endogenous change is often the emergence of what we call a contrarian 
party, defined as a party that bucks the dominant incentive of the existing system. Precisely 
because it does so, such parties can be expected to fail more often than they succeed. However, 
when there is a sufficient popular constituency for them, the logic of interparty electoral 
competition can generate incentives for established parties to respond. The result may be 
electoral or other institutional reform, or it may be changes to the organization of congress or 
simply to party strategy. The point is that a former equilibrium of an extreme situation is upset, 
generating the possible emergence of a new, less extreme, equilibrium. Of course, such 
endogenous evolution is not the only possible outcome. The old equilibrium may reassert itself, 
or the system may collapse and be replaced entirely, whether through presidential emergency 
powers, citizen-sponsored referendum, or military intervention. In this section we sketch some of 
the notions of endogenous evolution that have been offered consistent with neo-Madisonian 
themes. 
 In the case of Brazil, as we noted, Amorim Neto and Santos (2003) find that the 
inefficient secret model (ISM, adapted from Shugart and Carey, 1992: chapter 9) accounts for the 
executive’s leadership in areas of national policy, which leaves congress free to attend to its 
members’ more parochial concerns. Thus, Amorim Neto and Santos find, pro-executive 
legislators rarely initiate legislation of national scope. However, in a manner not anticipated in 
the ISM, parties unaffiliated with the executive are quite active in initiating proposals of national 
scope. By doing so, they so contrast themselves with the dominant political forces, and their 
activities thus can be seen as the product of the competitive dynamic that they face; in other 
words, interparty competition may respond to latent demands from the ultimate principal, the 
voters, for new forms of representation and thus lead to the emergence of alternative agendas. 
 Foremost among the opposition in Brazil in the first two decades of civilian rule was the 
PT, a very clear example of a contrarian party. The PT was organized as a national party and on 
a programmatic basis. The other main parties have little national organization and are often the 
vehicles for the exercise of influence by state-level leaders; they allow their rank-and-file 
politicians great leeway in cultivating personal votes within the open-list PR system. However, 
unlike the personal-list system formerly used in Colombia, Brazil’s systems of open party lists 
permits a party to engage in a contrary strategy of cultivating party votes as a means of 
differentiating itself from competitors. In Brazil, voters may cast either a party or a candidate 
vote, and the PT, uniquely among Brazil’s major parties, emphasized the party vote (Samuels 
1999).
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 Returning to the notion of multiple equilibria in organizational forms referenced above, 
we see in the example of the PT a party whose optimal approach to representation differs so 
fundamentally from the established patterns of Brazilian legislative politics that their ascendancy 
itself alters the system’s competitive dynamic. A new emerging equilibrium may therefore favor 
not only more programmatic representation and competition, but eventually more congressional 
professionalization and nationally-oriented executive-legislative transactions.
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 The political dynamic of Venezuela in the 1970s and 1980s bears a resemblance to the 
endogenous emergence of a contrarian party that we saw in Brazil. Whereas in Brazil’s hyper-
representative and personalistic party system the contrarian party was the programmatic PT, in 
Venezuela the contrarian party was a highly decentralized (albeit, like the PT, leftist) 
Movimiento a Socialismo (MAS). In a neo-Madisonian theory of party organization that stresses 
the ultimate accountability of representative agents to their citizen-principals, we might expect 
that dissatisfaction with the performance of an extreme system would create “political space” for 
an alternative message and organizational form. Indeed, the MAS, founded out of the remnants 
of 1960s guerrilla campaigns, grew electorally in the 1970s and 1980s. It developed a more 
decentralized nomination procedure than the other major parties and its members were more 
likely to sponsor locally targeted legislation and to break party discipline that those of the major 
parties, especially the AD (Crisp 1998). Why, then, did this contrarian party not generate an 
endogenous solution to Venezuela’s systemic failure? This is a question worthy of further 
research.  We suspect the answer lies in the extreme institutionalization of two-party collusion 
and consultative politics (Crisp 2000), which rendered the system relatively less adaptable than 
the more fluid Brazilian system. In any event, the system ultimately changed exogenously, 
through the election of populist Hugo Chávez Frias, who used emergency powers to overturn the 
existing constitutional order (having failed in 1992 to do so via a military coup). Chávez appears 
to be presiding over a “party” every bit as centralized as (although far less institutionalized than) 
the AD that he has replaced.
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 Thus the Brazilian system has evolved endogenously from a hyper-representative system 
towards one that might be tentatively characterized by two broad blocs of parties, capable of 
organizing the legislature in support of the government, and towards a somewhat less 
personalistic position on the intraparty dimension.
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 In Venezuela endogenous evolution failed. 
The rise of Chávez, although partially explicable through the systemic failure of the former 
hyper-centralized system,
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 is a case of exogenous change, in that existing institutions were 
broken, with a political “outsider” at the helm, in order to bring about political change. Similarly 
in Colombia, our example of the opposite extreme on the intraparty dimension, the recent 
changes in the electoral system towards reduced fragmentation In both dimensions were pushed 
by an exogenous factor, the election of Alvaro Uribe from outside the traditional two-party 
competitive pattern.
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 Nonetheless, there were signs of endogenous evolution in Colombia as 
well, in the emergence in congressional elections after 1991 of new “movements” that, contrary 
to the established parties, attempted to articulate national and reformist agendas. As expected in 
an electoral system that promotes extreme personalization, however, few of these could move 
beyond tight identity with their national leader and few could elect more than one senator, 
despite the single nationwide district (Shugart, Moreno, and Fajardo 2006), the large magnitude 
of which otherwise would favor the proportional representation of new parties. 
Summary 
 We have reviewed the central features of neo-Madisonian theory and a set of works on 
individual or multiple Latin American democratic experiences that have contributed to its 
development. This work has built most of its insights around legislative ambition, and how this is 
shaped by electoral rules on both the inter- and intraparty dimensions, the interaction of national 
and subnational politics, and other factors. The insights derived from the analysis of legislative 
ambition allow for systematic comparison of the incentives of legislators to engage in policy-
based transactions with the executive, or to abdicate the formal independence of their branch in 
favor of a more or less hierarchical relationship with the president. Several Latin American 
countries have demonstrated extreme patterns in the relationships between actors and 
institutions, and we have called attention to theoretical considerations regarding how these have 
contributed to systemic failures—sometimes leading to regime breakdown, other times to 
significant political change within democracy. We now turn to a consideration of several areas 
that we identify as research frontiers for the neo-Madisonian approach. 
Extensions of neo-Madisonian theory 
 There are several areas where extensions of the neo-Madisonian framework have not 
been broadly applied or have only just begun to make significant contributions. We identify four 
frontiers for this research: subnational government and the components of federalism; the 
“output” side, understood as policy-making and accountability; the “demand” side of voter 
preferences and interest groups; and the judiciary and other non-elected agents. 
Disaggregating Federalism 
As we have noted, one of the contributions of neo-Madisonian work on Latin America 
has been to highlight the important role that subnational elections and actors often play in 
national politics, especially how the party-system fragmentation follows a logic of electoral 
competition at the subnational level, where political careers may be centered. Other work has 
emphasized the importance of a local orientation in systems with intraparty competition, versus 
the greater role of party leadership in relatively more centralized parties. These different types of 
systems have specific consequences in federal democracies--for instance, in Brazilian legislators’ 
targeting pork-barrel amendments towards municipalities or the dominance of provincial leaders 
within national parties in Argentina. Nonetheless, the intensive study of the component 
institutions of federalism promises to enhance our evolving understanding of how national and 
subnational politics are intertwined in Latin America. 
Madison, in Federalist 46, explained that "the federal and state governments are in fact 
but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed 
for different purposes… the ultimate authority... resides in the people alone.”  Federalism, in 
neo-Madisonian theory, is fundamentally another dimension of the separation of powers shaped 
by interaction with other constitutional features and partisan patterns. Figure 2 illustrates the 
stylized separation of powers as outlined in the above sections with the dimension of federalism 
included, where relations of hierarchy are shown by solid lines with arrows extending from 
principal to agent, while transactional relations are depicted with dotted lines having arrows at 
each end. 
 [Figure 2] 
National and subnational governments are constitutional agents, which under federal and 
decentralized institutions are hierarchically accountable to the electorate. Whereas each state or 
provincial government is accountable to its own subnational electorate, the national government 
is accountable to an aggregation of all of them, constituting the demos in Stepan’s (2001) 
conceptualization of federalism. In ideal-typical federalism these sovereign subnational 
governments exist in transactional relations with the national government. That is, what 
delineates federal from unitary systems is that unitary systems are hierarchical, with the 
subnational governments clearly subordinate to the national government. Just as either the 
president or the assembly may have the “upper hand” in interbranch bargaining in a presidential 
system, according to the constitutional allocation of powers, so too constitutions vary in the 
extent of powers allocated to the national or subnational governments. A system is not formally 
federal, however, if it does not establish that subnational governments include their own 
executives, assemblies, subordinate agencies and judiciaries, independent of national authority.
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Federalism entails separate origin and separate survival among national and subnational 
agents, a division of powers among those agents (and, again, within each ‘agent’), and a wide 
range of variation in the extent to which countervailing ambition is fostered between these 
agents. Just as a strong degree of convergent interests between presidents and assemblies negates 
the separation of powers, formally strong regional governments may be agents of the national 
government if the political careers of subnational legislators and governments make them 
accountable to the president or central party leaders. Conversely, actors within subnational 
governments may control the fates of national actors -- for example, in the nomination process.  
While either of these scenarios tend toward hierarchical relations (of opposite character), a 
balanced transactional relationship includes incentives for subnational actors to resist or 
counteract efforts by the national government to encroach upon provincial authority and for 
national actors to maintain independent political control over their delineated duties.  Hence, just 
as the appearance of presidential dominance over a subservient legislature should not be taken as 
an indicator of a “strong presidentialism,” neither is apparent subnational dominance necessarily 
an indicator of "robust federalism." Given the importance of transactions to the Madisonian 
conceptions of both presidentialism and federalism, the “strongest” or most “robust” 
manifestation of either phenomenon is to be found when its component institutions are most 
balanced and transactional. The extent to which transactional relations prevail is shaped in both 
cases by the interparty and intraparty incentives facing actors in each branch and at each level.  
The importance of subnational politics to the national political system in federal (and 
some nonfederal) countries has become widely studied in recent years (e.g. Gibson 2004), 
particularly with regard to the politics of decentralization (e.g. Eaton 2004, Montero and Samuels 
2003).  Nonetheless, there remains relatively little work that is devoted specifically to an analysis 
of politics at the state or provincial level. While existing literature has highlighted, for example, 
the extent to which governors are major players in national politics (Samuels 2003; Jones 1997, 
2001), we know much less about the extent of transactional or hierarchical relations between 
governors and their state legislatures, and still less about how national and subnational 
bureaucracies and courts relate to one another. Some recent work has begun to highlight intra-
country variation in subnational politics. For instance, Langston (2003) considers variations in 
the ability of PRI state party organizations in different Mexican states to cope with electoral 
defeat. Desposato (2000) analyzes how variations in voter demands in different states shape the 
legislative party organization across Brazil’s state party systems.  Future insights on subnational 
variations in federal systems promise to enrich our understanding of patterns of Latin American 
political systems.   
The Output Side: Policy, Accountability and Bureaucracies 
Most of the neo-Madisonian literature, as we have noted, has focused on the strategies of 
politicians seeking election and their behavior within legislative and executive institutions. 
Relatively less attention has been placed on the “output” side—that is policy and the 
bureaucracies that implement it, and the extent to which voters hold politicians accountable for 
their policy choices. 
The characteristics of policy. The question of how, and how well, democracy “works” 
depends critically on the process by which policies are enacted, and whether voters have the 
capacity to hold politicians accountable. The  analysis of specific policy outcomes, or patterns of 
outcomes, is in its relative infancy. We have already discussed how one of the neo-Madisonian 
insights is the extent to which different electoral systems—principally in their variations on the 
intraparty dimension—affect the balance between national and local policy. Several recent works 
have significantly advanced our understanding of the relative balance between national and local 
policy by classifying laws and bills according to their national, sectoral, or parochial scope 
(Taylor and Diaz 1999, Crisp et al 2004, Amorim Neto and Santos 2003).  
In addition to the national-local policy balance, another trade-off exists between the 
stability and flexibility of policy (Tsebelis 1995, 2002, Cox and McCubbins 2001, Shugart and 
Haggard 2001). When bargaining on national policy, the interaction of presidential powers and 
divergent interests between presidents and assemblies can lead to highly stable policy, 
potentially sacrificing flexibility. Concentrating powers and political goals, meanwhile, can risk 
flexibility to the point of arbitrariness. Baldez and Carey (1999) provide the example of Chile 
where, until recently, budget stability was enforced by a rightist “veto” on legislation enabled by 
appointed senators and Jones (2001) highlights the budgetary indecisiveness in Argentina when 
presidents have faced an opposition legislature.    
Accountability for policy. If democracy, conceived as a chain of delegation, “works,” 
then it must be that the political system represents voters’ policy preferences, and allows voters, 
as principals, to sanction their agents, rewarding or punishing them according to their 
performance.
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 Stokes (1999, 2001) considers representation in which tentative citizen beliefs 
can be modified in the wake of successful policy outcomes, citing examples in Argentina and 
Peru in which presidents pursued unpopular economic policies they did not campaign on that 
constituents would ultimately support when seen as successful. Samuels and Shugart (2003) 
suggest institutional variations behind these circumstances, noting a likely trade-off among 
presidential configurations between representing mandates and accountability, in which strong 
presidents are held clearly accountable for their actions despite deviating from stated 
intentions.
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 Samuels (2004) provides some evidence that, as institutions promote divergence in 
the policy focus between the branches, legislative accountability for national economic policy is 
diminished relative to proactive presidents. Johnson and Crisp (2003) argue that while party 
labels do not predict well the policies presidents pursue with respect to economic liberalization, 
the label of the legislative majority has served a reliable predictor. However, they find that more 
interparty fragmentation or intraparty fragmentation seemed to hinder legislatures in promoting 
their partisan ideological positions on neo-liberal reform.  
 Bureaucratic agents and policy-making. The proximate source of most actual policy 
outputs lies in the choices of bureaucrats, to whom politicians delegate specific decision-making 
and implementation authority. If politicians, as principals in the final link in the delegation chain 
of democracy (refer to Figure 2), cannot control the choices and actions of their bureaucratic 
agents, then it is unlikely that either representation or accountability can function. A neo-
Madisonian theory of democratic policy-making treats the bureaucracy as, ideally, an agent of 
elected politicians; however, work applying this notion emphasizes the difficulties in enforcing 
political control over appointed agents.
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 Considerable advances have been made regarding how 
politicians structure the incentives of bureaucrats in the US, notably the institutional 
enfranchisement of constituent interest groups
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 Such insights are beginning to be applied to 
Latin America, and as we noted with respect to legislative ambition taking as variables in Latin 
America many features of the political landscape that Americanists can take to be constant. 
For example, studying delegation to the bureaucracy in Argentina, Eaton (2003, cf. 
Morgenstern and Manzetti 2003 and Jones et al. 2002) argues that career-motivated legislators 
face party-centered electoral incentives that drive them toward their party leaders’ (and the 
president's) position, favoring the delegation of greater authority to the executive (in contrast to 
the congressional control sought by more constituency-oriented US legislators). In the Chilean 
case, Siavelis (2000) suggests that the high concentration of policy agenda control in the 
executive branch, coupled with an authoritarian legacy that limited interest group formation, has 
rendered legislative oversight of the bureaucracy relatively ineffective. Such work suggests how 
neo-Madisonian logic can help scholars identify and explain variations in legislative oversight of 
the bureaucracy. Such oversight may be most likely, for example, when the political interests of 
the president and assembly overlap the least (i.e., divergence on the interparty dimension) and 
when legislators’ fates are independent of party organizations (i.e., divergence on the intraparty 
dimension). 
The Demand side: Voter preferences and interest groups 
Like the output side, what we call the “demand” side has also been relatively neglected 
by work emphasizing neo-Madisonian themes. The demand side concerns how the preferences of 
citizens, as the ultimate principal in a democracy, affect politicians’ strategies and how interest 
groups are involved in the policy-making process. Variations in the ways in which societal 
demands are organized and incorporated into policy-making critically impacts the manner in 
which citizen demands are aggregated (or suppressed), and by extension, the institutional 
functioning described in this chapter.  
Voter preferences. An emerging agenda integrates relatively neglected variations within a 
nation's social demand structure with neo-Madisonian ideas.  Such variations in voter 
preferences across time or region shape elite competition patterns just as the incentives facing 
elites shape their response to these demands. Taylor-Robinson (2004) explores the interaction 
between formal and informal institutions in determining democratic agents' incentives for 
representing poorer versus wealthier voters as their principals.  Taylor-Robinson uses factors 
discussed above -- career path incentives, party nomination procedures, and access to patronage 
resources -- to explain the logic of providing poor voter-principals with clientelistic private 
benefits or local public goods, as opposed to national public goods. Desposato’s (2000) study 
comparing state-level party systems in Brazil explores how policy demands vary by state, noting 
that voters’ priorities of public over local/private goods shape variations in electoral strategies. 
Thus, holding institutional incentives constant, Desposato finds a variation in degrees of 
cohesion across the nation's subnational legislative party systems.  Lyne (2004) endogenizes 
Brazil's national institutions to voters’ own collective dilemma between clientelist and public-
goods exchange relationships.  As this tension has been resolved in favor of the latter, party 
organizations have responded with internal practices that counteract individualizing electoral 
incentives. 
Interest groups. Among the few works that have studied interest groups within a neo-
Madisonian thesis is Crisp's (2000) case study of the interplay between Venezuela's evolving 
society and once rigid political institutions. Crisp synthesizes the survival and effects of 
institutions and broadens the definitions of political concentration and diffusion beyond the now-
traditional institutional variables emphasized above.  As mentioned above, Crisp attributes the 
collapse of the party system, economic stagnation and political corruption to an institutionally-
induced disincentive for elites to respond to social demands and adapt to crisis.
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 By Crisp’s 
account, legislative accountability failed under Venezuela's centralized and collusive parties 
while unaccountable independent commissions and state enterprises allowed monopolistic peak 
interest associations to supplant elected officials’ role in policy and stifle reform. Crisp suggests 
that centralization of business and labor participation interacts with presidential authority and 
electoral incentives to shape the overall trade-off between participation and governing 
efficiency—each factor potentially compensating for the others.
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The judiciary and other non-elected agents of accountability  
 In Federalist 51, where Madison justifies the importance of separate origin and 
survival—“members of each [branch] should have as little agency as possible in the appointment 
of the members of the others”—he makes a critical exception to this principle for the judicial 
branch. He does so for two reasons. First, “because peculiar qualifications being essential in the 
members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures 
these qualifications.” Second, “because the permanent tenure by which appointments are held in 
that department must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.” 
Thus Madison recognized the need for special expertise for judges, and saw both the origin of 
judicial authority in appointments by elected institutions and life terms as critical to achieving 
that expertise. In Latin America, on the other hand, both the formal adherence to these principles 
and the actual practice have come up short of Madisonian ideals. The consequence has been 
limited accountability of politicians to the rule of law and serious shortcomings to liberty and 
democracy. An emerging literature on these themes is connected to the long-standing debate on 
democratic accountability in Latin America (see e.g. O'Donnell 1994, 1998; Mainwaring and 
Welna 2003).  
Relationships with non-elected agents are shaped by the very same forces noted in other 
neo-Madisonian applications: the degree of independence of those agents and the source of their 
rewards and sanctions. Along these lines, Helmke (2002), argues that judges with insecure tenure 
in Argentina served as agents of the executive (in defending presidential decrees) but shifted 
their rulings away from the government as they perceived their impending principals, holding 
future sanctioning power, would ultimately emerge opposed to the current regime.  Magaloni 
(2003) explains that the Mexican Supreme Court was traditionally subordinate to PRI presidents, 
as were legislators and the constitution itself.  Despite formal life tenure, Magaloni shows that 
service on the Court was typically just a steppingstone in a political career, violating Madisonian 
ideals of a specialized and independent judiciary. As the disciplined PRI majority within the 
Congress gave way to multiparty competition in the mid-nineties and hierarchical control faded, 
the Supreme Court was allowed independent authority to fill the role of coordinating 
constitutional disputes.
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Moreno et al. (2003) focus on the empowerment of superintendence agencies (attorneys 
general, controllers general, etc.), which, despite potentially providing performance information 
to the electorate, are imperfect substitutes for the type of citizen-legislature connection that 
fosters a transactional relationship between the elected branches. Moreno et al. note, as we have 
described above, extreme positions on the interparty or intraparty dimensions in Latin America 
have often undermined the transactional relationship. Without incentives to act independently 
and collectively,  politicians are unlikely to permit the emergence of effective independent 
checks in the form of the judiciary or superintendence agencies, given that—as  Madison 
suggested—the appointment of the members of these bodies is generally in the hands of elected 
politicians.
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Conclusion  
Students of Latin American democracy have made significant progress in recent years by 
disaggregating the institutional arrangements that structure the political process.  A clear lesson 
from neo-Madisonian theory it is that no institution can be understood in isolation. The body of 
work that we have discussed here is rooted in the ideas articulated in the Federalist Papers, 
while integrating more recent economic theory, especially collective action and principal–agent 
relationships. Like Madison’s well-known arguments, the basic assumptions are grounded in the 
self interest of politicians. In this manner, neo-Madisonian theories share a common thread with 
contemporary rational-choice approaches. Nonetheless, the neo-Madisonian enterprise is broader 
theoretically in that it does not see institutions themselves principally as static constraints on 
strategic action. Like the so-called historical institutionalism (Skocpol, Evans, and Rueschmeyer 
1985) that is often portrayed as a theoretical rival to rational choice, neo-Madisonian theory 
takes into account how earlier generations of politicians created institutions that constrain present 
actors.
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 It also explicitly seeks to understand how institutions shape the very preferences of 
actors—for instance, for national public versus locally-targeted goods—and often takes a 
dynamic perspective, as our discussions of extreme systems and endogenous evolution of 
behavioral patterns within institutions showed. 
Neo-Madisonian theory posits that political outcomes are a product of strategic 
politicians operating within a nested set of both principal-agent (i.e. vertical) and transactional 
(i.e. horizontal) relationships. Scholars employing neo-Madisonian concepts have tended to zero 
in on the strategic choices faced by individual presidents, legislators, judges, or other actors, 
while using this focus to draw broad implications about the collective outcome of these 
individual choices. Democracy under a separation of powers “works” to the extent that the 
choices of political actors tend to enforce accountability by promoting independence and 
countervailing ambition between the agents of the electorate. Democracy can “fail” to the extent 
that the institutional incentives inhibit the accountability of agents to their (supposed) 
constituencies by generating de facto hierarchies of agents that, according to constitutional 
design, should transact on public policy.  
Among the empirical contributions of this perspective reviewed here is a greater 
understanding of the diversity of presidential powers in the region, including the extent to which 
presidential influence derives from formal powers or partisan factors, and the varying capacity of 
differently situated presidents to enact their national agendas. Another key contribution has been 
to highlight the interplay of subnational and national actors, and the role of electoral institutions 
in skewing outcomes in favor of narrow minorities versus national majorities. Other promising   
lines of research have begun to extend these insights on the concentration or fragmentation of 
political power to specific policy outcomes, assessing democratic accountability, and on the 
endogenous evolution of patterns of political competition.  
As we have seen, many of the most promising conclusions of the literature have come 
from single-case studies. While these case studies have been informed by a general theoretical 
logic and by reference to other country experiences, relatively few recent works have drawn 
conclusions and implications that synthesize across the region. Indeed, many of the authors 
whose works we have situated within this perspective have not necessarily framed their work as 
part of some broader “enterprise.”  Yet it is clear that a degree of cumulative knowledge has 
developed, built "block by block, from the bottom up" (Smith 1995). Our hope is that by 
attempting to forge a theoretical synthesis among works published in a wide variety of outlets 
that we have pointed the way towards an overarching perspective that will inform further work 
on how and why democracy works or fails in Latin America. 
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Figure 2 
The separation of powers: stylized hierarchical and transactional relationships 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
Additional work on this topic includes Wagner (1966), Salisbury (1969), Frohlich, 
Oppenheimer, and Young (1971), and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1978) 
2
 later developed by subsequent works on the theory of the firm. See for example Williamson 
(1975, 1979) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
3
 See also Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Demsetz (1983), and Miller (1992). See 
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993) for brief reviews of this 
literature.  
4
 Of course, the hierarchical juxtaposition of formal institutions can also serve democracy.  In the 
British model, only one party governs at a time, appointing its leader as chief executive in a clear 
hierarchy.  There are no institutional checks, but the presence of “Opposition with a capital ‘O’” 
(Helms 2004) provides the electorate with a monitor that serves to keep the governing party in 
check (Palmer 1995, Strøm 2000). In parliamentary coalitions, parties within the cabinet serve as 
checks on one another.  Studies of coalition-based parliamentary systems using a framework 
similar to that we describe here include Thies (2001), Martin (2004), and Martin and Vanberg 
(2004). See also Shugart (2007).  
5
 Though, until 1913, not directly of state electorates. 
6
 In a hierarchical political system—such as the British model—such divisions of executive and 
legislative authority cannot occur. See Palmer (1995) for a discussion. 
7
 In other words, in Olson’s (1965) terms, the rational individual will have an incentive to “free 
ride” and the result will be “underprovision” of the public good, to the detriment of all members 
of the party. 
8
 That is, rather than “importing” the assumptions of American politics, many studies of Latin 
American institutions have sought to develop a generalized framework for institutional analysis 
with implications and applications that subsume the U.S. case. 
9
  Explicating the logic of political careers in Latin America dates back at least to the 
pathbreaking work of Smith (1974, 1979). 
10
 Throughout this chapter, we make reference to legislatures as "agents.”  This simplified 
concept of the legislature as a unitary agent can be disaggregated into several more precise 
concepts. The “party system” is an agent of the electorate, a collective agent able to be 
characterized in the aggregate based on the parties in the legislature—for example as fragmented 
or ‘personalistic.’  A party (and sometimes, faction or coalition),as a subset of the party system , 
is a collective agent of a subset of the electorate and has its own unique characteristics, for 
example, programmatic or clientelistic. An individual legislator is an agent of her constituency, a 
subset of the electorate, which may be geographically concentrated or dispersed, ideologically 
homogeneous or heterogeneous. In some cases, as we note, this "constituency" may be solely 
within the party leadership.  The extent to which one concept versus another is useful depends 
upon both the circumstances of the case in question and the topic of concern.  
11
 Relatively speaking. That is, one does not have to believe that presidents are free of less 
exalted motives, such as enriching their place of origin or themselves, in order to believe that 
                                                                                                                                                             
national public goods are relatively more important to their election and administration of the 
government than is the case for the typical legislator.  
12
 For instance, the “impossible game” of trying to reconcile Peronists and their opponents in 
Argentina (O’Donnell 1979) or the polarization between a minority socialist president (Salvador 
Allende) and the center-right dominated legislature in Chile (Valenzuela 1978).  
13
 See Przeworski et al. 2000, Cheibub and Limongi 2002, Cheibub 2002 
14
 One of the reasons for this, the lack of reelection incentive, is discussed with later in this 
chapter. 
15
 Note that here we refer to the actual preferences of the legislature relative to the president in a 
given instance.  As we review work dealing with the institutions shaping those preferences, we 
will refer to incentives that increase or decrease the likelihood of legislators with such 
preferences, as is the case with electoral and career incentives. 
16
 For an elaboration of the concepts of interparty and intraparty dimensions, see Shugart (2001, 
2005). 
17
 In Bolivia, Under the 1967 constitution, the president is directly elected only if one candidate 
has a large enough pre-election coalition to obtain a majority.  In elections prior to 2005, an  
electoral majority was not achieved, triggering the constitution’s provision that congress selects 
the president from among the top vote-winners (from the top three prior to 1993 and from the top 
two since). See Mayorga (2001). 
18
 Uruguay, as recently as 1966, was the exception, with its elected executive council. 
19
 Shugart and Taagepera (1994) propose a hybrid of majority and plurality, aspects of which 
have been adopted in Argentina and Ecuador. See Shugart (2004) for a general overview of 
election methods for presidents in Latin America and elsewhere, and for an analysis of trends in 
favor of direct election and majority runoff. 
20
 This literature, representing some of the most influential work in comparative institutions, has 
its origins in the study of European politics and established democracies more generally. 
21
 As well as localizing incentives in the electoral system, considered in the next section on 
intraparty institutions. 
22
 Consistent with what seems to be the scholarly consensus, we understand a federal system to 
be one in which subnational divisions of the country (e.g. states, provinces), have their own 
executive, legislative (and usually judicial) systems, as well as some sovereign authority 
guaranteed by the national constitution. 
23
 The “effective” number has become the standard measure of electoral or legislative 
fragmentation. It is simply a weighted index of the number of parties, where the weights are 
determined by each party’s own size. That is, each party’s share of votes (or seats) is squared, the 
squares are summed. The reciprocal of this sum is the effective number (Laakso and Taagepera 
1979). 
24
 Brazil averaged 6.3 in its effective number of parties during the 1945-1962 and 1990-1994 
periods. However, the average at the district level across these periods was only 3.3 (Cox 1999). 
Hence, multipartism in Brazil derives less from its district magnitudes and low electoral 
threshold than might be assumed. 
25
 In presidential systems, even if the executive has a copartisan legislative majority, party 
discipline and the executive’s role as party leader are distinct concepts. For instance the 
legislative party could be highly disciplined yet be under the leadership of a factional leader 
opposed to the president, or the president could hold a de jure or de facto leadership role in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
party, but be unable to discipline the legislative caucus. Something approximating the former 
situation existed in Guatemala when Efraín Rios Montt was legislative leader of the Frente 
Republicano Guatemalteco, but a rival leader, Alfonso Portillo Cabrera, was president. The latter 
situation has typified many Colombian presidents’ relations with their own majority party.  
26
 This combination may contribute to what Coppedge (1994), writing on Venezuela’s largest 
party, Acción Democrática, referred to as “partyarchy.” A similar phenomenon is described by 
Taylor (1996) in Honduras. 
27
 This logic is thus a generalization of that put forth by Cox and McCubbins (1993) for US 
House parties.  Additionally, legislators delegating the least power to party leaders tend to have, 
via constitutional provisions, “delegated” proactive legislative power to the president. As a 
result, weak parties are usually associated with strong presidents (Shugart 1998) 
28
 Closed-list systems in Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras and Venezuela, and more candidate-
centered rules in Chile and Colombia.    
29
 Although not considering Latin American cases, Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen (2005) show 
that attributes of legislators that signal commitment to serving local interests (e.g. birthplace, 
lower-level electoral experience) vary with magnitude differentially, according to whether party 
lists are open or closed. 
30
 The possible variance in the extent of nationalizing incentives for presidents based on different 
electoral formulas, regionalization of the vote, closeness of the outcome, eligibility for 
reelection, or the use of primary elections (an intraparty variation) has not been analyzed 
extensively thus far. 
31
 Longer time horizons—i.e., the possibility that faithful service will result in periodic renewal 
of the contract—provide an incentive for agents to respond to the threat of removal and, 
therefore, to be accountable to their immediate principals. 
32
 Thus, term limits do not necessarily favor public goods-oriented legislators (as sometimes 
argued by term-limits advocates in the US) 
33
 A point also made by Taylor (1992) 
34
 Carey’s study is a useful example of the two-way flow of theoretical and empirical insights 
between studies of the United States and Latin America. Carey adapts theories of legislative 
ambition to the different context of Costa Rica and Venezuela, generalizing the theory and 
testing inferences arising from his Latin American cases in the US (see also Carey, Niemi and 
Powell (2000). 
35
  An analogy in the theory of the firm can be made to agents who account for the labor market 
and weigh outside opportunities as they execute tasks delegated by their current principals. 
36
 Other work examining the impact of subnational and bureaucratic career paths for legislators 
includes Jones (2002), O’Neill (2002) and Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno (2003).  
37
 The term, “pluralitarian”, indicates that the political force with concentrated authority may not 
actually require a majority of votes to maintain its control. 
38
 No simplified depiction of complex political systems, such as that shown in Figure 1, can take 
account of all relevant variables that affect legislative incentives. For instance, we do not take 
account of federalism, except to the extent that the regional differences of a federation are 
reflected in the number of parties (interparty dimension) or the relationship between national 
party leadership and individual legislators. The most important case that is not well represented 
by the scales of Figure 1 is Argentina. As shown by Jones (2002), Argentine legislators have 
little incentive to represent specific interests and are quite subservient to party leaders. However, 
                                                                                                                                                             
those leaders are not generally national leaders, but rather provincial leaders. Thus, from the 
standpoint of a given province, representation approximates the situation depicted by the upper-
right quadrant.  However, when the various provincial delegations are brought together in the 
national legislature, the balance of local and national interests implies a more moderate scale 
position. Unlike in the US—or even Brazil—that balance is not obtained through legislative 
constituencies that give members considerable independence from their party leaders, but rather 
by the existence of a transactional relationship between provincial party power-brokers. 
39
 Shugart (2001) presents an index, but few of the cases considered there are Latin American. 
40
 For simplicity, we do not differentiate here upper and lower houses. Our discussion will refer 
mainly to lower houses, with occasional references to different incentives in a given upper house. 
Of course, we recognize that upper houses should be taken more seriously than they are in much 
of the literature, as in most Latin American bicameral systems the two houses are roughly equal 
in authority. 
41
 Especially in comparison to the Brazil’s post-War democratic period (Lyne 2005) 
42
 Particularly in the pioneering work of Scott Mainwaring (1995, 1997,1999) and Barry Ames 
(1995a, 1995b, 2001). See also Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997), Desposato (2004), 
Morgenstern (2004), and Carey and Reinhart (2004). 
43
 We discuss these changes in more detail below, in considering the possibility for endogenous 
evolution of extreme systems.  
44
  It should be reiterated, however, that pluralitarian outcomes in legislative competition could 
alternatively promote an extreme divergence between executive and assembly political goals if 
the branches were controlled by opposing political forces. In Mexico, of course, PRI control of 
both branches produced extreme commonality of political goals. However, a similarly reactive 
president (in terms of constitutional powers) combined with a disciplined, opposition-dominated 
assembly could result in an irreconcilable conflict of goals, and result in genuine deadlock. A 
proactive president in the same scenario could produce even more destabilizing conflict, as both 
actors would have sharply diverging preferences and unilateral means to put them into effect, 
with no clear means for resolving differences (Linz’s dual democratic legitimacies problem). 
45
 For instance, intervening in intraparty disputes in various states, as described by Weldon 
(1997: 252-54). 
46
 The term, collusive, is applied to Venezuela by Norden (1998) in her comparative assessment 
of party-system configurations in the region. 
47
 The different consequences of these distinctive manifestations of the dominant–subservient 
pattern have not received attention in the literature; however, we would expect that the Mexican 
variant allows for greater flexibility (or, if one prefers, arbitrariness). That is, the greater 
dependence of legislators on the president in Mexico, due to single-party majorities and the 
absence of congressional careerism, implies a lesser institutionalization of the procedures by 
which the president and party organization bypass the formal congressional check on the 
executive. In Venezuela, on the other hand, the largest party, AD, frequently was short of a 
majority and was riven by factions (Coppedge 1994). To manage this more complex political 
situation, the AD and COPEI maintained a delicate bipartisan and interest-group balance on the 
consultative commissions. We interpret Crisp (2000) as saying that these political transactions 
rendered the policy-making process overinstitutionalized and hence less able to adapt when 
confronted with the pressures that resulted from the exhaustion of the statist economic model and 
the drop in oil prices in the 1980s and after. The danger of overinstitutionalization is articulated 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the context of the Soviet Union by Roeder (1993), who applies a neo-Madisonian perspective 
to authoritarianism--an authoritarian parallel that has been noted in previous works (e.g. 
Coppedge 1994). 
48
 We borrow this term from Norden (1998). 
49
 Similarly, Mayorga (2001) describes Bolivia’s shift to a mixed system as also linked to a crisis 
of legitimacy among entrenched parties and an effort to enhance the weak electoral linkages 
associated with closed lists. 
50
 The crucial difference when compared to Brazil’s open list system is that candidates running 
under a common party label share votes in Brazil; votes for individual candidates are pooled for 
purposes of interparty allocation. They were not pooled in Colombia, resulting in no necessary 
relation between a party’s votes and its seats (Shugart, Moreno, and Fajardo 2006). Chile’s 
system, as discussed below, is also open list, but the unusual 2-seat districts generate a rather 
different competitive logic. 
51
 For a detailed account of the process of electoral reform in Colombia and an analysis of the 
performance of the new system in the 2006 election, see Shugart, Moreno, and Fajardo (2006). 
52
 In fact, when measured by the number of lists presented, the effective number of 
representative agents—here, blocs of parties—declined to nearly two in the last election before 
the coup of 1973. Thus it could be that it is not deadlocked multiparty competition over national 
issues that is most threatening to the survival of a presidential system, but deadlocked two-bloc 
competition and divided government when the opposition legislature is programmatic and 
nationally oriented. Such a scenario would arguably be the closest approximation of Linz’s dual 
democratic legitimacies, with clear, but opposed, “wills” articulated by each branch (with the 
further proviso that the president, as well as congress, would have to have the constitutional 
means to push its agenda). However, this is not a matter we can resolve here, given the paucity 
of empirical experience with such configurations. 
53
 The Venezuelan party system was also quite fragmented, as measured by the effective number 
of parties, in the 1960s. However, this period was the height of AD-COPEI collusion, and thus 
the party system did not have the competitive dynamic of a hyper-representative system. 
54
 On some occasions—notably, an attempt to forgive agrarian debt—the FMLN and other 
parties aside from ARENA have been willing to build coalitions (though facing the prospect of a 
presidential veto), so the legislature is not irretrievably polarized. 
55
 The opposite corner of Figure 1, the lower right, represents the combination of pluralitarian 
and hyper-personalistic representation. No Latin American system has approximated this 
combination, though Colombia briefly contained elements of it, as discussed above. Outside 
Latin America, Taiwan in the 1990s perhaps would be a closer approximation. See Haggard and 
Noble (2001). 
56
 Also, it is worth noting here that, in terms of presidential power over legislation, the reactive 
US presidency also has moderate legislative powers: relatively weak, particularly when 
compared to the proactive presidencies of Argentina, Colombia or Brazil,. 
57
 See Shugart, Moreno, and Fajardo (2006) for an application of the notion of systemic failures 
of an extreme system to the case of Colombia.  
58
 Party votes do not affect the order of election of candidates from the party’s list, which 
actually means that for a party like the PT that obtains a larger percentage of party votes than 
most other Brazilian parties, its candidates are winning their seats based on smaller shares of 
personal votes. However, the more important distinction is that voters for the PT are 
                                                                                                                                                             
overwhelmingly delegating to the party as a whole, whereas in other parties voters’ primary 
agents of representation are the individual candidates to whom they give their preference votes. 
 
59
 On the different possible equilibria connecting career incentives and intra-legislative 
organization, see Samuels (2003:33). 
60
 It is worth noting that the MAS was part of the electoral coalitions that elected both Rafael 
Caldera in 1993 and Chávez in 1998. However, in the absence of being able to present a viable 
candidate of its own, MAS failed to present a party-based alternative to the established party 
system and was left to back super-partisan populist candidacies.  
61
 This is not to say that this sort of evolution that we describe can only continue to move in the 
same direction.  
62
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